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ILLUSION AND CONTRADICTION IN
THE QUEST FOR A DESEGREGATED
METROPOLIS
Henry W. McGee, Jr.*
It is the policy of the United States to provide, within con-
stitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States.
42 U.S.C. § 3601.1
From its inception, the Negro ghetto was unique among
the city's ethnic enclaves. It grew in response to an implacable
white hostility that has not basically changed. In this sense it has
been Chicago's only true ghetto, less the product of voluntary de-
velopment within than of external pressures from without. Like
the Jewries of medieval Europe, Black Chicago has offered no
escape. Irishmen, Poles, Jews, or Italians, as they acquired the
means, had an alternative: they could move their enclaves to
more comfortable environs or, as individuals, leave the enclaves
and become members of the community at large. Negroes-for-
ever marked by their color-could only hope for success within
a rigidly delineated and severely restricted ghetto society.
Allan H. Spear2
America is worse than South Africa, because not only is
America racist, but she also is deceitful and hypocritical. South
Africa preaches segregation and practices segregation. She, at
least, practices what she preaches. America preaches integration
and practices segregation. She preaches one thing while deceit-
fully practicing another.
Malcolm X8
A decade of litigation in which the central issue of discrimination
essentially was uncontested4 thus far has failed to disestablish racial
* Professor of Law, University of California, Los Angeles. Member of the
California and Illinois Bars. The author gratefully acknowledges research
support in the preparation of this article by the U.C.L.A. Center for Afro-
American Studies.
1. Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
2. A. SPEAR, BLACK CHICAGO: THE MAKING OF A NEGRO GHETro 229 (1967).
3. MALCOLM X SPEAKs 75 (Ist ed. G. Breitman ed. 1965).
4. A concise chronology of the decade of litigation is provided as an Appendix
entitled THx SAGA OF DoRoTHY GAUTREAux at 1012, infra.
"The findings [as to racial segregation] were neither challenged nor appealed."
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segregation or produce desperately needed low-income housing for
Chicago blacks. Recently, the unconcluded litigation has produced a
unanimous United States Supreme Court decision exposing suburban
racial sanctuaries to the possibility of integrated public housing units.5
Although the first-named plaintiff in the suit, Dorothy Gautreaux, did
not survive the decision,' the extent of her posthumous triumph is the
central theme of this article.
In Hills v. Gautreaux the Court held that "a metropolitan area
remedy. . . is not impermissible as a matter of law,"" when a govern-
ment agency with metropolitan wide authority, has violated the Consti-
tution by funding housing in a discriminatory manner. The use of a
metropolitan area remedy under these circumstances does not offend
the principle of Milliken v. Bradley8 which forbade metropolitan area
relief against school districts on the premise that "a federal court is re-
quired to tailor the scope of the remedy to fit 'the nature and extent
of the constitutional violation'."'  In Milliken the limits of federal
equity power expired at the school district boundary line. "Innocent"
school districts were insulated by the Court from "interdistrict" or-
ders.10 In Gautreaux, however, the Court affirmed the propriety of
disregarding municipal boundary lines in the desegregation of Chica-
go's public housing, because the relevant geographic lines for purposes
of the inner-city black's housing options includes within their "noose""
Gautreaux v. CHA, 503 F.2d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 1974), a!f'd sub nom. Hills v. Gaut-
reaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
A poignant footnote in the decision finding HUD complicitous in racial discrimina-
tion is more compelling than a page of statistics:
* * ' Plaintiff Gautreaux has accepted public housing in Negro areas only be-
cause she has been living in a one bedroom apartment with a family of six. Plain-
tiff Odell Jones had moved to segregated public housing with his wife and three
children to escape their two rooms in which "the rats had begun to run over the
house at will."
Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 737 n.12 (7th Cir. 1971).
5. Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
6. Interview with Alexander Polikoff, attorney for plaintiffs/respondents, in
Chicago, Illinois (June 11, 1976); N.Y. Times, April 21, 1976, at 1, col. 8.
7. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1550 (1976).
8. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
9. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1544 (1976).
10. 418 U.S. at 745. "Insulated" may be too strong a word. Interdistrict orders
have been entered since Milliken thereby weakening its "requirement of significant inter-
district segregative effects." Note, Interdistrict Desegregation: The Remaining Options,
28 STAN. L. REv. 521, 522 (1976). See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ.,
510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975) and Evans v. Bu-
chanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1975), af 'd, 423 U.S. 963 (1975).
11. The metaphor is the now famous one of the UrnED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL Rirrs, 1961: HousiNG 1 (1961). It appears again in NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUnHIN THE AMERuCAN CmTy 1 (1968).
In Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing Authority, 355 F. Supp. 1257, 1260
(N.D. Ohio, 1973), rev'd, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974), Chief Judge Battisti described
the same phenomenon with a less grim but equally descriptive phrase: "at present,
[metropolitan Cleveland] has the racial shape of a donut, with the Negroes in the hole
and with mostly Whites occupying the ring."
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the suburbs"2 as well as the city. Although this may appear as one law
for school boards and another for city councils (or local housing author-
ities"3 ), the Court limited its decision to the question of whether federal
courts have authority to order governmental units with metropolitan
wide authority to take remedial action within a metropolitan area, out-
side of the center city.' 4 The distinction between school desegregation
cases and housing desegregation cases, therefore, rests not upon the
relative complexity of enforcing court-ordered desegregation,'" but
upon the scope of the equity power of the federal courts.' 6
Newspaper headlines trumpeted the pronouncement in Gautreaux
as momentous.17  The initial response to the decision was that it prom-
ised the end of an era in which blacks effectively had been banned
from the suburbs and the beginning of an era in which equality finally
would be achieved through the integration of all communities. Sec-
ondary assessments, however, were more cautious. Reflection upon
the current status of public housing revealed the practical limits of the
decision.' 8 Public housing programs were stalled by a receding Con-
12. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1547 (1976).
13. Public housing projects are administered by local housing authorities, permitted
by federal law to be "any State, County, municipality, or other governmental entity or
public body . . . , which is authorized to engage in the development or administration
of low-rent housing .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 1402(11) (1970). 'These local authorities
[are] created pursuant to State law, and their members are usually appointed by the
mayors of the respective localities," S. REP. No. 84, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1949).
On the problem of different desegregation requirements depending on geographic
locale if not governmental activity, see Karst, Not One Law at Rome and Another at
Athens: The Fourteenth Amendment in Nationwide Application, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q.
383.
14. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1545 (1976). Both CHA and HUD have authority to operate
outside of the Chicago city limits, id. at 1546. The opinion has added significance since
"in many states the jurisdiction of the local housing authority extends beyond the bound-
aries of a central city," Rubinowitz & Dennis, School Desegregation Versus Public
Housing Desegregation: The Local School District and the Metropolitan Housing Dis-
trict, 10 URBAN L ANNUAL 145, 166 n.69 (1975), citing, for example, Hawaii, Illinois,
Ohio, and New Mexico.
15. The court of appeals in Gautreaux v. CHA, 503 F.2d 930, 935-36 (7th Cir.
1974), "erred" in interpreting Milliken as limited to the determination that metropolitan
area remedies were impermissible in school desegregation cases because of the "admin-
istrative complexities of school district consolidation and the deeply-rooted tradition of
local control of public schools." See Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1544-45 n.l1
(1976).
16. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1544 (1976).
17. See, e.g., "Justices Uphold Minority Housing in Suburbs," N.Y. Times, April
21, 1976, at 1, col. 8, which described the case as a "landmark victory for civil rights
groups." See also L.A. Times, April 21, 1976, § 1, at 1, col. 5, which headlined its
story "Way Open for Public Housing in Suburbs."
18. Unfortunately, the decision applies only to Chicago. An abundance of politi-
cal, economic, and legal barriers to the dispersal of subsidized housing still exists in other
metropolitan areas. Cf. Editorial, "HUD and the Suburbs," Washington Post, April 23,
1976, § A, at 28, col. 1; Oser, "Supreme Court Ruling in Chicago Case is Likely to
Have Only a Limited Effect," N.Y. Times, April 22, 1976, at 21, col. 1; and "U.S. Su-
preme Court Rules Metropolitan 'Remedy Permissible in Gautreaux," The Potomac Insti-
tute, Inc., Metropolitan Housing Program Memo 76-4 at 1 (April 22, 1976).
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gressional commitment to the housing program, 9 coupled with the Ad-
ministration's decision to shift from conventional public housing proj-
ects to the new Section 8 strategy (the major conduit of housing sub-
sidies in the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act).20
Further analysis of the decision also revealed conceptual limitations.
Subsequent decisions of the Court reinforced these doubts by raising
serious questions about the scope of the case. 21
19. The 'state of the union' in 1976, as viewed in the January 19 message of the
President ...and in a following statement on January 21 by Senator Edmund S.
Muskie (D. Maine)-speaking for the Democratic Party-is a 'state' in which hous-
ing and community development do not exist. In neither of these messages is there
a recognition of housing and community development as issues with any priority
status or any relationship to the national welfare.
In major policy terms, the HUD budget for fiscal year 1977 calls for a decrease
in the federal financial contribution to the operation of existing public housing proj-
ects.
The only new public housing units to be reserved in fiscal year 1977 are 6000 units
for Indians, mandated by the Congress.
[a]bout 92,760 units. . . are due to be completed over the next two years.
Nenno et al., HUD 1977 Fiscal Budget, 33 J. HOUSINo 71, 72-75 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as Nenno].
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(b) (Supp. IV 1974) provides HUD with authority to enter
into assistance contracts with private and public sponsors of newly constructed and sub-
stantially rehabilitated dwellings, paying directly to landlords part of the rent so as to
reduce a typical tenant's payment to 25% of his income or less. Existing dwellings pri-
vately owned are also eligible for the program, and in fact, the activity to date has been
largely in the existing dwellings program. "Section 8 constitutes the key housing as-
sistance program of the 1974 Act. . . . It modifies and replaces a proposed revision
of the public housing leasing program (Section 23 of the Housing Act of 1937) to re-
place the rental housing assistance programs (Section 236 and rent supplements) that
were suspended by the Administration in January 1973." Kristof, The Housing and
Community Development Act of 1974: Prospects and Prognosis, 27 J. ECON. & Bus.
112, 112-13 (1975).
m ..The section 8 program, as presently scheduled by the Administration would
pass all other assisted housing programs in terms of new commitments ...
The appropriations for assisted housing contained in the HUD budget are heavily
weighted toward the Section 8 program. They just about close out activity under
all other assisted housing programs. And they place a heavy emphasis on leasing
of existing housing and acquired troubled properties of the Federal Housing Ad-
ministration, rather than on new construction and substantial rehabilitation.
Nenno, supra note 19, at 74. For a brief account of the metamorphosis of rental subsi-
dies-§ 236 to moratorium to § 8-see, McGee, BOOK REvIEw, Housing Subsidies in
the U.S. and England, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 734, 739-45 (1975). See also text accom-
panying notes 267-312 infra.
21. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976) and City of Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976). See text accompanying notes 77-
170 infra. One assessment of these two cases has opined:
June [of 1976] has been so discouraging a month for those looking for federal court
vindication of the interests of the underhoused that it is difficult to assess which
opinion is the most serious setback. In Eastlake the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of mandatory referendums on any land use decision; in Wash-
ington v. Davis it disapproved leading lower court civil rights opinions in the course
of ruling that evidence of disproportionate racial impact does not suffice alone to
invalidate an official act as discriminatory ...
The Potomac Institute, Inc., Metropolitan Housing Program, Memo 76-6 at 1 (June 30,
1976).
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Gautreaux, therefore, portends an impasse in the Court's struggle
with discrimination and desegregation. Confronted in Gautreaux with
egregious and blatant violations of the Constitution, the Court met the
challenge of "the recalcitrant"22 and sanctioned relief. But the fre-
quently more subtle and more persistent manifestations of racial dis-
crimination may elude the Court's current instruments of analysis. If
clear-cut violations of the magnitude of those in Gautreaux are requi-
site before the federal courts may act, then Gautreaux's promise of
equality is illusory. Constitutional violations may not always be as ob-
vious as those condemned in Chicago or in Blackjack, Missouri.23 Dis-
criminatory practices in public housing often take on "a more sophisti-
cated bent than the Neanderthal practices of Chicago."2  Moreover,
in light of the Court's pre- and post-Gautreaux deference to the land
use hegemony of local communities,25 the decision represents serious
contradictions. Although Gautreaux superficially indicates that a fed-
eral judge has the power to desegregate federally subsidized housing
and thereby spearhead a breakout strategy for inner-city-trapped mi-
norities, more recent land use decisions have strengthened the power
of racially segregated suburbs to maintain economic, and hence, racial
"purity."2" Indeed, within a few weeks of the Gautreaux decision, the
22. Mr. Justice Clark, sitting by designation on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, used the word "recalcitrant" in the opinion later confirmed by the Supreme Court
to condemn those in the City of Chicago political establishment who frustrated compli-
ance with the orders of the district court, Gautreaux v. CHA, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir.
1974), a! 'd sub nom. Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976). "With his orders being
ignored and frustrated as they were, he kept his cool and courageously called the hand
of the recalcitrant." 503 F.2d at 932.
23. United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). See text accompanying notes 249-57 infra.
24. Kushner & Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation After Milliken v. Bradley: The
Case for Land Use Litigation Strategies, 24 CAT. U.L. REV. 187, 206 (1975). But see,
however, the rather transparent strategies of Atlanta, Georgia area officials condemned
in Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir.
1972).
25. See Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of Zon-
ing Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 5-9.
26. The word is from the oft-retracted "ethnic purity" phrase of President-elect
Jimmy Carter. Carter allegedly used the phrase on April 2, 1976, while flying across
upstate New York in an interview with Sam Roberts, chief political correspondent of the
New York Daily News. "And, asked about low-income scatter-site housing in the sub-
urbs, [Carter] replied: 'I see nothing wrong with ethnic purity being maintained. I would
not force a racial integration of a neighborhood by government action. But I would not
permit discrimination against a family moving into the neighborhood.'" The original
interview and some of Mr. Carter's various retractions are collected in an article, "Jimmy
Carter and 'Ethnic Purity,'" Washington Post, April 11, 1976, § C (Outlook), at 7, col.
3.
Mr. Carter subsequently approved of Gautreaux, saying:
It still leaves a substantial amount of flexibility to local communities. I don't think
this ruling means that in every neighborhood and block in Pittsburgh [where Carter
was present when he, commented on the case] you have to have low-income housing
built. But if there is a definite pattern of collusion between the community and
H.U.D. to exclude low-income housing, that's illegal.
N.Y. Times, April 21, 1976, at 61, col. 6.
[Vol. 1976
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Court upheld an exclusionary land use device by permitting the resi-
dents of Eastlake, Ohio to veto by referendum a land use change ap-
proved by both a planning commission and city council. 27  The practi-
cal result of this classic demonstration of "devotion to democracy"2 8 was
to halt the construction of a multifamily, high-rise apartment building.
Although the exclusionary implications of the decision did not escape
the notice of the Ohio Supreme Court justices,2 9 the United States Su-
preme Court ignored the exclusionary effects and focused instead on the
due process rights of the landowner. 0 This article will discuss the con-
tradictions and conflict between Gautreaux's use of a metropolitan area
remedy and the Supreme Court's land use decisions. First, however,
this article will explore both the reality and the illusion of Gautreaux.
I. THE REALITY OF Gautreaux
Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion described the litigation in Gautreaux
as "extended,"'" an understatement that surely must rival any to issue
from the Court. This article will refrain from an extended discussion
of all of the details of the 10 year delay 2 that deprived the plaintiffs
of any practical results from the district court's judgment that was en-
tered on July 1, 1969.13 Out of the maze of litigation, however, evi-
dence emerged of, in Justice Clark's words, "a callousness on the part
of [the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA) and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)] towards the rights of the
black, underprivileged citizens of Chicago that is beyond comprehen-
sion." 4  As the unanimity of the frequently divided Supreme Court
emphasizes, Dorothy Gautreaux's case was a paradigm of racial dis-
crimination. Her fight was one of the most protracted struggles in the
27. City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976). See
text accompanying notes 217-22 infra.
28. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971).
29. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 198, 324
N.E.2d 740, 748 (1975) (concurring opinion) and text accompanying note 220 infra.
30. 96 . Ct. 2358 (1976).
31. Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 15,41 (1976).
32. Justice Clark, in the court of appeals decision, similarly refrained from an ex-
tended discussion of the delays. Gautreaux v. CHA, 503 F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1974).
33. A history of the litigation would consume an article by itself. Even a skeletal
chronology, which provides a pathway through the 10-year maze of litigation, is too
lengthy to appear in the footnotes of this article and will be found as an Appendix en-
titled THE SAGA OF DOROTHY GAurREAUX at 1012 infra.
34. Gautreaux v. CHA, 503. F.2d 930, 932 (7th Cir. 1974) (Clark, J.). Earlier
the district judge had said:
There have been occasions in the past, in other parts of this country, when chief
executives have stood at the school house and the state house doors with their faces
livid and their wattles flapping, and have defied the federal government to enforce
its laws and decrees. It is an anomaly that the 'law and order' chief executive of
this City should challenge and defy the federal law. Apparently, 'law and order'
applies only to the enforcement of state law and municipal ordinances.
Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366, 370 (N.D. IM. 1971).
No. 4]
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history of the continuing national search for equal justice under law. 5
Dorothy Gautreaux and five other tenants filed federal court cases
in 1966 against CHA and HUD. 6 In 1969 the district court judge,
a former prosecutor, found that during some 20 years CHA had se-
lected locations for public housing that resulted in a total of 30,848
units that were more than 99 percent black and that were located in
black, or predominantly black neighborhoods. Four projects, however,
which were built prior to 1944 in white neighborhoods all had black
tenant populations of 7 percent or less. These four projects had more
than 90 percent white tenants even though 90 percent of the persons
on CHA waiting lists were black. As a result of vetoes by white city
councilmen, more than 99 percent of CHA's proposed public housing
sites in white areas were rejected after they were initially found to be
35. Indeed, the lawsuit was part of a larger struggle in the city for racial justice
that extended back to the 19th century. One historian has written:
At first glance, Chicago's racial problem in 1966 [the year Gautreaux was
filed] seemed vastly different from the problems of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Quantitatively there had been enormous change. Over ten
times as many Negroes lived in Chicago in 1966 as in 1920. . . . The ghetto occu-
pied large sections of the city that had been all-white just two decades before ...
Nevertheless, in many significant ways, remarkably little had changed since
1920. Increased numbers had vastly expanded the ghetto, but had not changed its
basic structure. Negroes were still unable to obtain housing beyond the confines
of the ghetto, and within the black belt the complex of separate institutions and
organizations that had first developed between 1890 and 1920 continued to serve
an isolated Negro populace. The same restrictions that had limited Negro oppor-
tunities in the early twentieth century still operated in 1966. In fact, four civil
rights bills, dozens of court decisions, and thousands of brace words about Negro
rights had barely touched the lives of Chicago's Negroes.
From its inception, the Negro ghetto was unique among the city's ethnic
enclaves. It grew in response to an implacable white hostility that has not basically
changed. In this sense it has been Chicago's only true ghetto, less the product of
voluntary development within than of external pressures from without. Like the
Jewries of medieval Europe, Black Chicago has offered no escape. Irishmen, Poles,
Jews, or Italians, as they acquired the means, had an alternative: they could move
their enclaves to more comfortable environs or, as individuals, leave the enclaves
and become members of the community at large. Negroes-forever marked by
their color--could only hope for success within a rigidly delineated and severely re-
stricted ghetto society.
A. SPEAR, BLACK CIcAGo: THE MAKING OF A NEGRO Gnrro, 1890-1920, 223-29
(1967).
Cf. J. WILSON, NEGRO POLITICS 6 (1960):
• . . Efforts by Negroes to deal with race relations in a Northern city are not sim-
ply blocked by hostile forces, although powerful obstacles are undoubtedly raised.
In part, Negro civic action is hampered by constraints inside the Negro community.
Some of the important obstacles to civic action are products of the Negro's own
community and way of life. Segregation may enforce, or even at some point in
time create, the Negro community as it exists today, but within that community al-
ternative modes of behavior are still possible. Segregation is a great determinant
of Negro life in the city, but it is not an invariable determinant. .-. . The Negro
may live in a prison, as a Negro author wrote, but 'the prison is vast, there is plenty
of space.'
The unsurpassed classic on life within Chicago's ghetto, however, remains that of
ST. CLAIR DRAKE & H. CAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS (1945) [hereinafter cited as DRAKE
& CAYTON].
36. See APPENDIX, THE SAGA OF DOROTHY GAUTREAUX at 1012 infra.
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suitable for public housing.17  HUD acquiesced in CHA's capitulation
to white intransigence, and rationalized its acquiescence on the premise
that it was better to fund a segregated housing system than to fund no
housing system.3 8
The district judge ordered CHA to construct its next 700 units in
white neighborhoods and to construct 75 percent of all public housing
in white areas. 9 Between September and November, 1969, the judge
issued five subsequent orders.40 When CHA failed to submit new sites
for Chicago City Council approval late into 1970, meetings were held
with the judge,41 at one of which a CHA commissioner confessed that
submission of sites to the city council before an upcoming mayoral elec-
tion would have adverse political consequences.4 2  The judge then im-
37. Gautreaux v. CHA, 296 F. Supp. 907, 909-12 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
38. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 737 (7th Cir. 1971).
39. Gautreaux v. CHA, 304 F. Supp. 736, 738-39 (N.D. Ill. 1969). The order
is analyzed in Note, Public Housing and Urban Policy: Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 79 YALE L.J. 712 (1970). CI: Daye, Role of the Judiciary in Community
Development and Housing: A Suggested Analytical Method, 52 J. URBAN LAw 689, 716-
32 (1975).
40. Gautreaux v. CHA, 436 F.2d 306, 308 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
922 (1971).
41. 436 F.2d 306, 308-311 (7th Cir. 1970).
42. Id. at 310. The adverse consequences described by CHA Chairman Swibel
were:
1) complete stoppage of the urgently-needed housing program; 2) racial ten-
sion in the city to the point of strife; 3) acceleration of an already alarming flight
to the suburbs by middle class White families, and 4) vigorous protests from the
Black community for failure to make housing available to them outside of the city.
Id. at 309.
Mr. Swibel was prophetic. All of the consequences materialized, although not
because of the construction of public housing, since no large projects have been con-
structed to this date. Only a handful of scatter-site units were built, and this provoked
organized resistance from affected white communities. See Nucleus of Chicago Home-
owners Ass'n v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147 (N.D. Ill. 1973), afI'd, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir.
1975). Racial strife over the housing issue continues unabated to this year. See Flan-
nery, "Judge Restricts Nazis; 5 Held in Fair-Housing March," Chicago Sun-Times, June
10, 1976, at 5, col. 1:
Lawyers for the city obtained a court order Wednesday that restricts the activities
of the local head of the Nazi Party and his followers in the racially troubled Mar-
quette Park area.
They also gained an agreement from the neo-Nazi leader, Frank Collin, that
the group would remove an offensive sign.-"Stop the Niggers"-from the west wall
of the group's headquarters ....
Meanwhile, five persons, including three ministers, were apprehended by police
as they lead some 40 youngsters marching to dramatize the need for open-
housing laws to protect black families in the Chicago Lawn area.
Violent opposition to black attempts to escape the ghetto has historically served as the
mailed fist inside the not so velvet glove of segregation. Cf. DRAKE & CAYTON, supra
note 35, at 65-73, 213; K. CLARK, DA GHETTO 235-36 (Roper ed. 1967); REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 119 (1968); MALCOLM
X, AUTOBIOGRAPHY 3 (1964). White flight and the expansion of the ghetto need no
documentation, but for judicial despair, see, for instance, Gautreaux v. CHA, 503 F.2d
930, 938 (7th Cir. 1974) and Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 384 (N.D. Ga. 1971),
affl'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
"Efforts by white residents to delay or stop construction of housing projects that
threatened their neighborhood have become fairly common (nationally]." Comment,
956 LAW FORUM [Vol. 1976
posed a timetable for submission of sites that the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed in the first of several appellate decisions
in the litigation." In 1971 the judge resorted to halting the flow of
$26 million in Model Cities funds in an effort to coerce the city to move
forward with the acquisition of new public housing sites." A divided
court of appeals panel reversed this order." The court of appeals,
however, upheld the judge's order suspending an Illinois law that re-
quired city council approval prior to construction of public housing proj-
ects, and directing the CHA to bypass the city council.4 6
With CHA and HUD both before the district court 4 7 the judge
ordered a comprehensive plan not confined within Chicago's city limits.
While the defendants were trying to convince the frustrated (if not ex-
hausted) judge that a "best efforts" plan could confine new housing
sites to Chicago and would not require metropolitan area relief, the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit announced its decision in Brad-
ley v. Milliken that permitted interdistrict relief for segregated public
schools.4 8  Nevertheless, the judge approved a city-only plan because
The Limits of Litigation: Public Housing Site Selection and the Failure of Injunctive
Relief, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1330, 1331 (1974), citing inter alia, Special Project, Public
Housing, 22 VAND. L. REV. 875 (1969) and the infamous resistance captured partly in
Forest Hills Residents Ass'n v. New York City Housing Authority, 69 Misc. 2d 42, 329
N.Y.S.2d 69 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd per curiam, 39 App. Div. 2d 64, 332 N.Y.S.2d 156, aff'd
sub nom. Margulis v. Lindsay, 31 N.Y.2d 167, 286 N.E.2d 724, 335 N.Y.S.2d 285
(1972).
43. Gautreaux v. CHA, 436 F.2d 306, 308 (7th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
922 (1971). See also APPENDIX, THE SAGA OF DOROTHY GAUTREAUX at 1012 infra.
44. Gautreaux v. Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ill. 1971). The Model Cities
Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-13 (1970), was enacted to improve the quality of urban
life. The Congressional findings state that "the quality of urban life is the most critical
domestic problem facing the United States," id. at § 3301. In an attempt to solve this
problem, Congress allocated $5 billion to be spent in neighborhoods of 150 "Model
Cities" in the early 1970's. Under the plan, each model city was to have a planning
year, followed by a series of 5 "action" years during which funds would be used for new
and innovative programs and institutional change in the areas of housing, education, em-
ployment, and health, id. See, e.g., NATIONAL HOUSING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
LAw PRoJEcr, HANDBOOK ON HOUSING LAw, vol. 1, Guide to Federal Housing, Re-
development and Planning Programs, ch. III, pt. III. For a detailed study of the devel-
opment of low-income housing in three major cities see MARSHALL KAPLAN, GANS, &
KAHN, THE MODEL CITIES PROGRAM (1970). See also C. HAA, BETWEEN THE IDEA
& THE REALITY: A STUDY IN THE ORIGIN, FATE & LEGACY OF THE MODEL CITIES PRO-
GRAM (1975). Professor Haar was one of the key draftsman of the Demonstration and
Model Cities Act of 1966, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3301-13 (1970).
45. Gautreaux v. Romney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972).
46. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973).
47. The court of appeals had reversed the district judge's earlier decision that
HUD should not be made a party to the suit, Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 737
(7th Cir. 1971).
48. 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S.
717 (1974). Fortuitously, the Supreme Court decision rejecting the use of metropolitan
area remedies in school desegregation, Milliken v. Bradley, was handed down while the
Seventh Circuit was considering Gautreaux v. CHA, 503 F.2d 930 (7th Cir. 1974).
Milliken had been argued before the Court on February 27, 1974, and was decided on
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* . * the wrongs were committed within the limits of Chicago and
solely against the residents of the City. It has never been alleged
that CHA and HUD discriminated or fostered racial discrimination
in the suburbs and given the limits of CHA's jurisdiction, such
claims could never be proved against the principal offender
herein.49
Yet another court of appeals opinion held that desegregating Chicago's
public housing program required metropolitan wide action. That deci-
sion distinguished the Supreme Court's opinion in Milliken v. Bradley
that had reversed the Sixth Circuit's use of an interdistrict remedy
against school districts.5 ° Ignoring pleas by civil rights groups to both
HUD Secretary Lynn and his successor, Mrs. Hills, not to appeal, the
government sought review. 51
In Hills v. Gautreaux52 the Supreme Court affirmed Justice
Clark's holding that a federal court should make every effort to employ
all reasonable means and methods necessary to achieve the greatest
possible degree of relief taking into account the practicalities of the sit-
uation."3 The Court also agreed that the "breadth and flexibility"5 4
inherent in the exercise of equity permitted a resort to suburban land
if desegregation of Chicago's public housing so required. The opinion,
written by Justice Stewart, addresses two basic issues. First, the opin-
July 25, 1975, the day after the Court ended its extended session on the fate of President
Nixon by deciding United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). On August 7, 1974,
the Seventh Circuit issued an unreported order requiring supplemental memoranda dis-
cussing Milliken v. Bradley, see Gautreaux v. CHA, Civil No. 74-1048 (7th Cir., Aug.
7, 1974). If the Milliken decision had not been decided before, or considered in, the
decision of Gautreaux v. CHA, yet another round of appeals may have been required
to reach the current status. See also Note, 43 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 663, 669 (1975).
49. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Il. 1973).
50. See note 48 supra.
51. The Potomac Institute, Inc., Metropolitan Housing Program, Memo 76-4, at I
(April 22, 1976):
The civil rights groups were trying to protect the support for housing dispersal poli-
cies provided by the . . . decision of the court of appeals. What HUD was trying
to protect, other than its independence from judicial supervision, by lodging the ap-
peal has never been clear (the "ethnic purity" of neighborhoods?). Perhaps HUD
was attempting to do what the Supreme Court now says cannot be done: to "trans-
form-Milliken's principled limitation on the exercise of federal judicial authority
into an arbitrary and mechanical shield for those found to have engaged in uncon-
stitutional conduct."
The government argued in its brief that metropolitan area relief "would significantly in-
terfere with [the] historic local autonomy over public housing . . . [and] lead suburban
communities to refrain from applying to HUD for public housing assistance . . . [which
could] severely impede the implementation of HUD programs designed to assure that
all citizens are adequately housed." The brief also raised the spectre that "the diffi-
culties entailed in effectuating inter-district public housing orders could prove even more
intractable than those that arise in the course of enforcing inter-district public school
desegregation orders." Petitioner's Brief at 30-31, 39, Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct.
1538 (1976).
52. 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
53. Id. at 1546, quoting, as did Justice Clark, from Davis v. Board of School
Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
54. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1970).
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ion distinguishes Milliken. Then the opinion addresses whether met-
ropolitan wide relief would interfere impermissibly with local govern-
ments and suburban housing authorities.
The Gautreaux opinion may owe its unanimity in part to the sup-
port that it arguably imparts to Milliken and in part to the extent that
it chips away at the outer edges of Milliken.55  Justice Stewart, who
provided the decisive vote in Milliken (and an opinion in which he
qualified the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court),58 described the es-
sence of Milliken as a case in which the Court held interdistrict relief
to be "an impermissible remedy not because it envisioned relief against
a wrongdoer extending beyond the city in which the violation occurred
but because it contemplated a judicial decree restructuring the opera-
tion of local governmental entities that were not implicated in any con-
stitutional violation." 7  Justice Stewart noted that Milliken had dis-
cussed the complexity of a possible interdistrict order combining De-
troit's school district with 53 other metropolitan area school districts;
but he stressed that the heart of Milliken was the limitation on federal
equity power. Because federal equity power is not plenary, but is
based upon the existence of a constitutional violation, 8 such a violation
must exist in order to invoke the power. The necessary predicate of
a constitutional violation which did not exist throughout the metropoli-
tan area in Milliken, was found to exist in Gautreaux because both
CHA and HUD had authority to operate outside the Chicago city
limits." Once the district court found a constitutional violation com-
mitted by a metropolitan area governmental entity, it was under a duty
to grant a metropolitan area remedy.60 To foreclose metropolitan re-
lief solely because the violation took place within the city limits61 would
transform Milliken's limitation on the exercise of federal equity powers
into "an arbitrary and mechanical shield for those found to have en-
gaged in unconstitutional conduct. '6 2
Justice Stewart thus diminished the importance of the suburban
boundary by undercutting what had been a strong peg of the Court's
55. See the brief opinion by Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and
White, in which Milliken is attacked and then desc.ibed as "distinguished" by Gautreaux,
hence in part their concurrence, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1550 (1976). Cf. Justice Clark's more
lengthy effort for the court of appeals, 503 F.2d at 935-37, which was disapproved
by the Supreme Court, 96 S. Ct. at 1544-45. For a critique of Justice Clark's efforts,
see Note, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 135, 141, which suggests that, "[I]f Gautreaux stands, Milli-
ken will become only an equitable restraint on inter-district remedies, rather than the
complete prohibition [when] it first appeared." See also Note, Interdistrict Desegrega-
tion: The Remaining Options, 28 STAN. L. REv. 521 (1976).
56. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 753 (1974).
57. 96S. Ct. 1538, 1545 (1976).
58. Id. at 1544.
59. Id. at 1546.
60. Id.
61. This was the rationale used by the district court in denying a metropolitan area
remedy. Gautreaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
62. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1547 (1976).
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opinion .in Milliken-the practical, political, and educational problems
that would arise if the district judge became a "super"63 school superin-
tendent. In Milliken Chief Justice Burger emphasized how ill-
equipped the courts are to handle the complex situations that would
arise in the supervision of a multidistrict desegregation order. Fur-
thermore, court supervision of such an order would deprive the people
of control of schools by their elected representatives. 4 The lack of
emphasis on the limits of federal equity power in Gautreaux may reveal
that Justice Stewart and some other members of the Court are uneasy
with the modest view of the federal equity power espoused in Milliken.
The essence of Milliken, as articulated in Gautreaux, is a refusal to "in-
volve" suburban school districts absent a showing of their implication
in inner city school segregation.
Although Gautreaux narrows the scope of Milliken,65 those who
formed the majority in Milliken may have subscribed to Gautreaux
solely because relief was extended in a situation in which the agency
implicated in unconstitutional activity operated across local government
boundaries. Some of the justices may have thought that to vote for
relief in a "single district" case would reaffirm their position that inter-
district relief should be extended only in the rarest of situations."
Thus, the first building block of the opinion was its careful delineation
of the limits of Milliken, not the limits of federal equity power.
The second stage of the Gautreaux opinion addressed the propri-
ety of metropolitan area relief. Even though a metropolitan area rem-
edy would cross local governmental boundary lines, the remedy would
apply only to one relevant geographical region. By finding that the
remedy would be restricted to a "single area," albeit an area that ex-
tended into several counties, the Court avoided the Milliken limitation
on federal equity power and concluded that the remedy was merely
intradistrict relief. An analysis of HUD's operation and of the nature
of the constitutional violation in Gautreaux strongly support Justice
Stewart's choice of a relevant geographic area:
Here the wrong committed by HUD confined the respondents to
segregated public housing. The relevant geographic area for pur-
poses of the respondents' housing options is the Chicago housing
market, not the Chicago city limits. That HUD recognizes this
63. The word was used by Chief Justice Burger in his opinion for the Court, Milli-
ken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 743 (1974), where he paraded the horrible possibility of
"a vast new super school district" if interdistrict relief were ordered.
64. Id. at 743-44.
65. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1546 (1976).
66. One is inclined to surmise also that a few of the Justices may have subscribed
to Gautreaux as a way out of the cul-de-sac of school desegregation, busing orders, and
fleeing whites. Perhaps the Court will "end-run" the school desegregation problem by
a strong stand on housing desegregation, which if successful, will solve the school deseg-
regation issue once and for all. See Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382, 392 (N.D. Ga.
1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
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reality is evident in its administration of federal housing assistance
programs through "housing market areas" encompassing "the geo-
graphic area 'within which all dwelling units. . .' are in competi-
tion with one another as alternatives for the users of housing."
. . . The housing market area "usually extends beyond the city
limits" and in the larger markets "may extend into several adjoin-
ing counties." An order against HUD and CHA regulating their
conduct in the greater metropolitan area will do no more than take
into account HUD's expert determination of the area relevant to
the respondents housing opportunities and will thus be wholly
commensurate with the "nature and extent of the constitutional
violation. 6 7
Having established that only a single geographic region was in-
volved, Justice Stewart then discussed the question of interference with
local governmental units. This issue had been paramount in Milliken,
in which an interdistrict order would have required the consolidation
and restructuring of 53 local school districts that had not committed
constitutional violations. Justice Stewart again chose to delineate the
limits of Milliken by emphasizing that interference with "innocent dis-
tricts" was beyond the Court's power only because of the absence of
a predicate for the exercise of the Court's equity power. He then
closed the opinion with a discussion of "[t]he more substantial question
[of] whether an order against HUD affecting its conduct beyond Chica-
go's boundaries would impermissibly interfere with local governments
and suburban housing authorities that have not been implicated in
HUD's unconstitutional conduct." 6
The question of interference with local government is "substan-
tial" indeed. Counsel for the tenants had emphasized, in an attempt
to avoid Milliken's shadow, that subsidized housing is established by
federal law, supported by federal funding, and pervasively federal in
administration. Furthermore, the joinder of HUD allowed the plain-
tiffs to argue that remedial action could be limited to the federal agency
and, even if extended to local agencies, would not involve reorganiza-
tion or consolidation of any local governmental units.69 Although no
actual order was before the Supreme Court,70 Justice Stewart accepted
the position of respondents that, at least in the instant case, a federal
court would have the ability to fashion an order that would not preempt
67. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1547 (1976).
68. Id.
69. Respondent's Brief at 16, Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976). The es-
sential argument for metropolitan area relief expressed in the brief is also articulated
by an associate of counsel for respondents in Rubinowitz & Dennis, School Desegrega-
tion Versus Public Housing Desegregation: The Local School District and the Metro-
politan Housing District, 10 URBAN L. ANNUAL 145 (1975).
70. The Seventh Circuit had remanded the case to the district court for entry of
a metropolitan area order, see Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1545, 1550 (1976).
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the power of local governments by undercutting the role of those gov-
ernments in the federal housing scheme.
Although the Supreme Court, by sanctioning metropolitan area re-
lief, merely manifested the policy embodied in Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,71 Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968,72 and
HUD regulations adopted pursuant to the antidiscrimination and af-
firmative action legislation, Justice Stewart felt impelled to reassure
suburban communities of their autonomy. He emphasized that orders
directed solely to HUD may not force unwilling localities to apply for
assistance under federal programs. Metropolitan area housing deseg-
regation orders may merely reinforce regulations guiding HUD's de-
termination of which locally authorized projects to assist with federal
funds.73 Stated more succinctly, only communities with federal proj-
ects are in significant danger of integration via low income housing. 74
Communities that presently do not have federal programs, but that are
contiguous to cities with federally subsidized programs, have substan-
tial safeguards to insure that federal housing programs are not initiated
in their communities without an opportunity to express their opposition.
As a further assurance that Gautreaux was not intended to infringe on
suburban autonomy, Justice Stewart explicitly stated what may become
suburbia's trump card: "The remedial decree would . .. [not] dis-
place the rights and powers accorded local government entities under
federal or state housing statutes or existing land use laws"75 (emphasis
added). Thus, local communities may preclude desegregation by
merely enacting zoning restrictions on low income and multi-family
dwellings or by requiring a referendum to change the zoning of any
land parcels within the community.76 This contradiction between the
policy behind Gautreaux and the Court's assurance that local communi-
ties may thwart the effect of Gautreaux is addressed in Section III
infra. Before proceeding to that discussion, however, two recent cases
that raise even more serious doubts as to the impact of Gautreaux will
be discussed.
II. THE ILLUSION OF Gautreaux
The potential sweep of the Gautreaux remedy is overshadowed
by the extent and character of the constitutional violation in the case.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (1970).
73. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1549 (1976).
74. See text accompanying notes 171-224 infra.
75. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1550 (1976).
76. The technique of requiring all zoning changes to be approved by a referendum,
which places the franchise rights of the local residents in counterpoise with the equal
protection rights of the discriminatees, was approved by the Court within weeks after
Gautreaux was decided, City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358(1976). Eastlake, of course, had been argued (March 1, 1976) before Gautreaux was
decided (April 20, 1976). See also note 296 infra.
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Racial discrimination and segregation permeated nearly every facet of
the operation of the Chicago Public Housing Program. 7 Apartheid
was its hallmark. Thus the Supreme Court in Gautreaux focused
only on relief. 9 Although Chicago's program was not unique, 0 quali-
fying for a Gautreaux metropolitan area order may require proof of bla-
tant and extensive constitutional violations. Furthermore, post-Gau-
treaux cases indicate that the Court will not be receptive to enforcing
orders on communities that are wealthy enough to forego federal hous-
77. Tenants were assigned on a segregated basis. There were only four white proj-
ects. In the balance of the projects, 99% of the tenants were black. After 1954,
all new projects were constructed in, or immediately adjacent to, the black ghetto. See
generally Gautreaux v. CHA, 296 F. Supp. 907 (N.D. Il1. 1969).
Cf. Fuerst, Public Housing: Promise and Despair in Chicago, PLANNING, AM.
SOC'Y. OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, Oct., 1973, at 14, quoting Elizabeth Wood, former CHA
Executive Director:
. . . Chicago is in a most violent though invisible state of war on the question of
race; and every public servant must elect on which side he will enlist, whose enmity
he will incur. Though he may seek with all his mind to find the safe way to play
it, there really is no safe way.
Cf. Ms. Wood's remarks with those of CHA Chairman Swibel, note 42 supra. Her
role and the politics of public housing are described in illuminating detail in M. MEYER-
SON & E. BANFIELD, POLITICS, PLANNING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE CASE OF PUB-
LIC HOUSING IN CHICAGO (First Free Press Paperback Ed., 1964).
78. Whether the use of the South African phrase is too extreme may be a question
of point of view. See A. SACHS, JUSTICE IN SoUTH AFRIcA 11 (1973), for the view that
the term apartheid has become internationally synonymous with segregation. Cf.
MALCOLM X SPEAKS, 54, 75 (1st ed. G. Breitman ed. 1965):
Any time you have a filibuster in America, in the Senate, in 1964 over the rights
of 22 million black people, over the citizenship of 22 million black people, or that
will affect the freedom and justice and equality of 22 million black people, it's time
for that government itself to be taken before a world court. How can you condemn
South Africa? There are only 11 million of our people in South Africa, there are
22 million of them here. And we are receiving an injustice which is just as criminal
as that which is being done to the black people of South Africa.
America is worse than South Africa, because not only is America racist, but
she also is deceitful and hypocritical. South Africa preaches segregation and prac-
tices segregation. She, at least practices what she preaches. America preaches in-
tegration and practices segregation. She preaches one thing while deceitfully prac-
ticing another.
79. 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1540-41 (1976).
80. While Gautreaux was being fought out in Chicago, public housing desegregation
struggles were underway on other fronts. Cf. Blackshear Residents Org. v. Housing Au-
thority, 347 F. Supp. 1138 (W.D. Tex. 1972) (Austin, Texas); Banks v. Perk, 341 F.
Supp. 1175 (N.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 473 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1973)
(Cleveland, Ohio); Croskey Street Concerned Citizens v. Romney, 335 F. Supp. 1251
(E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 459 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1972) (Philadelphia, Pa.); Crow v.
Brown, 332 F. Supp. 3,82 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (At-
lanta, Ga.); and Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp. 619 (E.D. La. 1969) (Bogalusa, La.),
discussed and compared with Gautreaux in Note, Racial Discrimination in Public Hous-
ing Site Selection, 23 STAN. L. REv. 63, 116 (1970). Site selection litigation spread to
state courts. See El Cortez Heights Residents & Property Owners Ass'n v. Tucson Hous-
ing Authority, 10 Ariz. App. 132, 457 P.2d 294 (1969). The cases are discussed in
Comment, The Limits of Litigation: Public Housing Site Selection and the Failure of In-
junctive Relief, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1330 (1974), which argues that courts found viola-
tions of tenants' rights but rendered "hollow" remedies. Often, the result of litigation
over site selection produced a Gautreaux effect-no public housing anywhere for anyone.
Cf. Recent Cases, Administrative Law-Urban Renewal, 85 HARV. L. REV. 870 (1972).
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ing funds. By not accepting federal housing funds, wealthy communi-
ties avoid the requirements of the 1964 Civil Rights Act banning racial
discrimination in federal programs"' and thereby maintain their ethnic
purity."2 Indeed, the Court held over for argument to the present term
(from the 1975-76 term) a case from a Chicago suburb, Village of Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,8 3 that will
81. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970), provides
that: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."
This declaration of national policy may be enforced by 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 which man-
dates the adoption of rules and regulations by federal agencies to enforce Title VI, and
provides that compliance may then be "effected .. .by the termination of or refusal
to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any recipient" fail-
ing to comply with the requirements of nondiscrimination. The Act specifically limits
the termination of, or refusal to grant, federal funds
to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such
a finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular program,
or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been found.
id. at § 2000d-1.
The careful delineation and circumscription of the federal bureaucracy's power to
obtain compliance with national policy has been reinforced by the leading Fifth Circuit
decision of Board of Public Instruction v. Finch, 414 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1969). The
decision generally is regarded as authority for the proposition that federal aid cutoffs
or grant refusals must be "pinpointed" to the specific program in which discrimination
has been found. The decision, however, does not consider or decide whether federal
agencies should lend assistance to a grantee in a program in which there is no direct
evidence of discrimination, but where the extension of aid insures or supports the viabil-
ity of the grantee and thus has the effect (concededly indirect) of supporting the dis-
criminatory activity.
Even as construed by Finch, Title VI, coupled with President Kennedy's Execu-
tive Order, Exec. Order No. 11,063, 3 C.F.R. 261 (Supp. 1962), 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1970), effectively can check discriminatory action by local governmental units.
But on a program-by-program basis HUD and other federal agencies are in a posi-
tion to implement federal anti-discriminatory policy in a significant way. HUD's regu-
lations implementing Title VI list some 38 programs it administers subject to Title VI.
Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs of the Department of Housing and
Urban Development-Effectuation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 24
C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.12, Appendix A (1976).
Among the programs that relate to the planning function, and hence involve poten,
tial or actual change in boundary lines, are: (1) Advance Acquisition of Land for Pub-
lic Purposes, § 704, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 3104
(1970); (2) Comprehensive Planning, § 701, Housing Act of 1954, 40 U.S.C. § 461
(Supp. V, 1975) (dealing with comprehensive planning assistance, planning research and
demonstration); (3) Reserve of Planned Public-Works, § 702, Housing Act of 1954, 40
U.S.C. § 462 (1970) (dealing with public works planning advances); (4) Slum Clear-
ance and Urban Renewal, ch. 8A, subch. 2, Housing Act of 1949, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1450-
1469 (Supp. V, 1975); and (5) Grants for Basic Water and Sewer Facilities, § 702,
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 3102 (Supp. V, 1975).
Finch indicates that the discrimination must be found within the "four corners" of
the program itself, or else bear a direct nexus with the discriminatory activity. Clearly,
Finch seems to speak against the propriety of withdrawing assistance from related HUD-
funded programs not part of the discriminatory activity in order to shrink the resources
of the local governmental unit. Still, local governmental units have some operative free-
dom to select from federal programs and still operate discriminatorily.
82. See note 26 supra for a discussion of the import of the phrase "ethnic purity."
83. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 373 F. Supp.
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squarely confront the Court with the issue of whether local govern-
ments may preclude the development of low income housing merely
in order to exclude integrated housing developments.8 4 The resolution
of Arlington Heights will reveal how much leadership the Supreme
Court will provide in the struggle for metropolitan desegregation.
Cases already decided, however, indicate that relief may be forthcom-
ing only in the most clearcut, and therefore rare, instances of racially
segregated housing.
A. Equal Protection Barriers to Desegregated Housing
Housing desegregation cases frequently rely upon the equal pro-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment and the due process clause
of the fifth amendment. Thus, the Court's interpretation of the equal
protection clause may determine the extent to which housing desegre-
gation is converted from an empty promise into an extant fact. Unfor-
tunately, the recent decision in Washington v. Davis8 5 raises serious
doubts about the willingness of the Court to intervene in governmental
action which impacts adversely upon racial minorities. The Davis de-
cision also may have confirmed the popular belief that the Court no
longer is "a major catalyst for obtaining social justice for blacks and
other Americans.""6
208 (N.D. Ill. 1974), rev'd, 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1030
(1975), on 1976-77 docket, 45 U.S.L.W. 3013 (July 27, 1976). See text accompanying
notes 155-170 infra.
84. Certiorari was granted in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp. on the following two questions: "(1) Does failure to grant rezoning request
for multiple-family housing for low and moderate income families in midst of single-
family area violate the Fourteenth Amendment even though Village was admittedly
maintaining integrity of its zoning plan and protecting neighborhood property values?
(2) Does alleged discriminatory housing pattern in Chicago metropolitan area impose
upon suburban municipality affirmative duty to ignore its admittedly proper zoning ordi-
nance to permit construction of multi-family low and moderate income housing?," 44
U.S.L.W. 3323 (U.S. Nov. 25, 1975). The tenor of these questions, of course, differs
significantly from the tenor of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decision
which found a denial of equal protection because the zoning plan of Arlington Heights
was not being consistently applied, 517 F.2d 409, 415 (7th Cir. 1975).
85. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976).
86. Judge A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., quoted in Mathews, High Court Keeps Low
Profile, L.A. Times, July 6, 1975, § IV, at 1, col. 1. Judge Higginbotham is a United
States District Judge for the Eastern District of Philadelphia.
Cf. Mathews, Law Strategy: Don't Take It to High Court, L.A. Times, May 10,
1976, § I, at 1, col. 1, quoting several civil rights lawyers sharply critical of the Court,
including Aryeh Neier, American Civil Liberties Union Executive Director: "Ever since
President Nixon's appointees took control of the court, they've been murdering us."
Also quoted is Hope Eastman of the American Civil Liberties Union Washington office:
'This Court is not just cool to new legal theories that would expand civil rights and civil
liberties, it is affirmatively hostile."
One of President Nixon's appointees, Mr. Justice Powell, in a rare move for a Su-
preme Court Justice, answered critics in an American Bar Association speech on August
11, 1976, declaring in part that it was "perhaps inevitable" that a new court would bring
"fresh and different assumptions and perceptions" to constitutional issues and, "mindful
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In Davis the Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals invalida-
tion of a qualifying test for District of Columbia police officers. The
court of appeals struck down the test as being an employment practice
that operated to exclude blacks on a basis unrelated to job perform-
ance.87 The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion by Justice White,
on the ground that the court of appeals erroneously had transferred and
applied the flexible standards of review used in Title VII cases into
the equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due process
clause.""
In Justice White's view the fact that four times as many blacks
failed the test as did whites was no reason to set aside the test designed
to select police officers in a community largely composed of minori-
ties.8 9 The more important question for Justice White was whether
the District of Columbia Civil Service Commissioners purposefully de-
signed and administered the test so as to discriminate invidiously
against blacks. The basic premise for the decision was that the Court
has never embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, re-
gardless of whether it reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is uncon-
stitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact."°
Conceding that racial impact was important in the Congressional effort
to make equal opportunity a reality in the nation's job market, Justice
White announced that the Constitution requires less of employers than
did the Congress that passed the 1964 Civil Rights Act.9"
of preserving the vitality of Democratic processes," the present Court is "more deferen-
tial to legislative judgments." Criminal Rights Rulings Defended, L.A. Times, Aug. 12,
1976, § I, at 1, col. 3.
For earlier studies of the impact of President Nixon's appointees, see Kurland, 1970
Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971 SuP. CT. REV. 265, and see
McGee, Blacks, Due Process and Efficiency in the Clash of Values as the Supreme
Court Moves to the Right, 2 BLACK L.J. 220 (1972).
87. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 959 (D.C. Cir. 1975), quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
88. 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2047 (1976).
89. "Among the applicants tested in the District of Columbia from 1968 through
1971, 57% of the blacks failed the test, as compared to a failure rate of 13% for
whites. . . . [B]lack applicants thus failed at a rate more than four times greater than
the rate for whites...." Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958-59 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
The population of Washington is predominantly, some would say overwhelmingly, black.
As long ago as 1960, it was 54% black, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMIS-
SION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 120 (1968). The black population of Washington, D.C. has
risen from 35% in 1950 to 71% in 1970, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSrRAcT OF THE UNITED STATES 1975 at 29.
90. 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2047 (1976).
91. Title VII requires more than a rational basis for the practices. The test must
be validated in terms of job performance, a process which "involves a more probing judi-
cial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and
executives than is appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, with-
out discriminatory purpose, is claimed." 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2051 (1976).
It has been said that, "[I]n the eyes of the Court, constitutionality [of a statute] is
as low a standard of legislative and political morals as we could have, and yet have any
at all." Curtis, A Modern Supreme Court in a Modern World, 4 VAND. L. REv. 427,
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Davis was filed prior to the 1972 amendments to the Civil Rights
Act which applied equal opportunity employment provisions to public
employers. 2 Relief, therefore, was sought on an equal protection the-
ory. 93 Because an employment situation was presented, however, the
court of appeals naturally looked to the experience of the courts in anal-
ogous situations. The court of appeals mistakenly applied the well-de-
veloped precedents that had governed the resolution of discrimination
in labor disputes. Later developments proved this to be a mistake.
Without express Congressional sanction, the experience of Title VII lit-
igation was inapposite.
In deciding the Davis case Justice White described the present
state of racial impact law. He drew from a variety of contexts, includ-
ing even the docketed, but unargued, Arlington Heights case." Im-
properly constituted grand juries, gerrymandered congressional appor-
tionment statutes, de jure segregated school districts, and Social Secu-
rity Act classifications all require more than disproportionate racial im-
pact before the Court will act. A discriminatory purpose may be in-
ferred from the totality of facts, including the fact of disproportionality.
Indeed, serious racial imbalance may demonstrate unconstitutionality if
the imbalance occurs in circumstances in which the discrimination can-
not be explained on nonracial grounds. Davis, however, suggests that
a law which is neutral on its face does not violate the equal protection
clause simply because it may affect adversely a greater proportion of
one race than of another.95  In Justice White's view the existence of
disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but neither is it the sole touch-
stone for determining invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution. Thus, under Davis a showing of disproportionate racial
impact alone will not invoke the rule that "racial classifications are to
be subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the
weightiest of considerations." 98
In reaching his conclusion Justice White swept aside the case of
Palmer v. Thompson.97 In Palmer the Court had held that the legiti-
mate purposes of an ordinance, which closed public swimming pools
rather than desegregate them (under the guise of promoting peace)
were not open to impeachment by evidence of racial motivation. Jus-
tice White had dissented in Palmer on the ground that the discrimina-
tory motivation for the action required relief.98 In Davis Justice White
433 (1951). Whether such a standard meets the exigencies of racially discriminatory
employment practices is questionable, but hopefully of marginal importance given the
coverage of Title VII. Cf. Chandler v. Roudebush, 96 S. Ct. 1949 (1976).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. H, 1972), amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
93. Relying on the authority of Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
94. 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2050 n.12 (1976). See notes 83-84 supra.
95. 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2049 (1976).
96. Id., citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
97. 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
98. Id. at 240-71,
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distinguished Palmer by declaring that Palmer did not involve a statute
having a neutral purpose but disproportionate racial consequences. 9
By so doing Mr. Justice White diminished the significance of Palmer's
warning against "grounding decision on legislative purpose or motiva-
tion, thereby lending support for the proposition that the operative ef-
fect of the law rather than its purpose is the paramount factor." 00 Yet
Justice White did not take the opportunity in Davis to place greater
emphasis on the operative effect of discriminatory action.' 01
Justice White, in a footnote, undercut several celebrated courts of
appeals opinions' 012 of the last decade. The footnote in Davis ironically
included dictum from an earlier stage of Gautreaux.0 3 Justice White
conceded that the cases impressively demonstrated that there is another
side to the issue of whether discriminatory impact without proof of pur-
pose may be the basis of a constitutional violation, but he promptly
countered that "to the extent [that the footnoted] cases rested on or
expressed the view that proof of discriminatory racial purpose is unnec-
essary in making out an equal protection violation, we are in disagree-
ment."1 4  Justice White's footnote portends a frightening impasse in
the Court's approach to racial discrimination. The footnote drew a re-
sponse from Mr. Justice Brennan in his dissent.' 0 5 Justice Brennan
attacked the propriety of the footnote in the Court's opinion by observ-
ing that one of the cases "disapproved" was scheduled for plenary con-
sideration by the Court in the upcoming term. Justice Brennan consid-
ered the Court's disapproving reference to the court of appeals decision
in Arlington Heights as constituting an attack upon the Court's grant
of certiorari. He then noted that any case that the Court considers
worthy of full briefing and argument should not be effectively reversed
merely by its inclusion in a "laundry list" of lower court decisions. 10 6
The brief, but perhaps meaningful disapproval of Arlington
Heights highlights the concern over the Court's posture toward less
99. 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2049 (1976).
100. Id.
101. Justice White's dissent in Palmer and his Davis opinion may be conceptually
consistent, but their practical consequences are quite disparate. In Palmer, one of the
grounds for dissent was the fact that the record indicated that Jackson, Mississippi closed
its pools to thwart desegregation, which was unacceptable constitutionally even if whites
as well as blacks were denied swimming opportunities since the effect of the closing was
to stigmatize blacks as inferior. 403 U.S. at 266. But in Davis, Justice White sanc-
tioned a disproportionate impact because discriminatory purpose was not proven even
though the effect of the action was more adverse to blacks than whites. Also, it should
be noted that the opportunity to work at issue in Davis was of greater consequence than
the recreational outlet foreclosed in Jackson.
102. 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2050 n.12 (1976).
103. Id. referring to Gautreaux v. Romney, 448 F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1971).
104. Id. at 2050.
105. Id. at 2056 n.l.
106. Id. Mr. Justice Stevens, who filed a separate concurring opinion, expressly dis-
associated himself from the premature consideration of Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 96 S. Ct. at 2054.
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overt forms of racial discrimination. The Court, since 1917, has con-
demned straightforward attempts at racial segregation in land use de-
vices or housing laws.107 The modem cases, however, present more
difficult issues that entail complex and interwoven motivations. An ac-
tion that may be well designed to achieve legitimate, necessary ends
of the general welfare still may have effects that injure racial minorities
and deny equal protection of the laws. The difficulty of determining
the constitutionality of these actions is discerning whether an ostensibly
neutral action denies equal protection. Most actions appear neutral on
the surface, but involve diverse motivations within the mind of each
decision-maker. l08
A test that requires even a minimal demonstration of motive to
establish an equal protection violation is an obstacle that often may
prove insurmountable. Justice Powell, who joined the Davis decision,
expressly had recognized the intractable problems in litigating intent
that are obvious to any lawyer. 09 Justice Powell warned that the re-
sults of litigating intent will be "fortuitous, unpredictable and even ca-
pricious.""'  Certainly, persons rarely confess publicly that they enter-
tain any racial bias or prejudice."' Given the unfathomable reaches
of the human heart, the consternation that Davis has evoked among
civil rights litigators 1 2 is not without some basis in the real world of
land use practices. As the chart below indicates, a wide spectrum of
land use related practices can operate disproportionately and discrim-
inatorily against racial minorities."' Sifting through the maze of facts
107. A string of cases beginning with Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) and
continuing through Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) has condemned attempts
to achieve racial segregation by use of housing and land use laws.
108. Amicus Brief of American Society of Planning Officials at 3, Village of Arling-
ton Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), cert.
granted, 423 U.S. 1030 (1975) (No. 75-616).
109. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1,413 U.S. 189, 233 (1973).
110. Id.
111. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 296 F. Supp. 266, 268 (W.D. Okla. 1969). In af-
firming, the court of appeals also articulated the obvious: "If proof of a civil right vio-
lation depends on an open statement by an official of an intent to discriminate, the Four-
teenth Amendment offers little solace to those seeking its protection." 425 F.2d 1037,
1039 (10th Cir. 1970).
112. See The Potomac Institute, Inc., Metropolitan Housing Program Memo 76-6,
at 4 (June 30, 1976) describing the Davis opinion as having "serious implications for
future litigation alleging official racially discriminatory housing and zoning poli-
cies. . ."
113. The literature of the problem, usually subsumed under the rubric "exclusionary
land use practices," truly is massive. A three volume compilation of the material is in
press by the URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, entitled MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF GROWTH;
ISSUES-TEcHNIQUES-PROBLEMS-TRENDS (1975). The seminal discussion is that of Sager,
Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN.
L. REv. 767 (1969). Cf. the more recent discussions by Ackerman, The Mount Laurel
Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1, and Rose,
Exclusionary Zoning and Managed Growth: Some Unresolved Issues, 6 RUTGERS CAM-
DEN LJ. 689 (1975).
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which typically characterize some of the situations set out in the chart
in an effort to divine motive will pose a burden on litigants ranging
from extraordinarily difficult to impossible.
Practices Which Can Lead to Exclusionary/Discriminatory
Results With Respect to Equitable Opportunities in Housing""
Exclusion by INTENT-
Purposeful Practices
Civil rights and fair housing viola-
tions in sales, leasing, rentals, or
advertising; block-busting.
Continued ghetto-area site selection
and construction for public/subsi-
dized housing.
Restrictive private covenants or in-
formal agreements re housing and
land use, to exclude minorities.
Referenda methods, or administra-
tive refusals, regarding low-income
housing development plans or proj-
ects.
Building moratoria (variations on
the no-growth, close-the-doors ap-
proach) where not absolutely essen-
tial.
Pursuance of unilateral slow-growth
policies in planning, etc., in defi-
ance of or without regional housing
need determinations.
Refusal to provide adequate capa-
city or funding for municipal serv-
ices, as sewage or water systems.
Issuance of building permits only
for high-cost housing which pro-
duces high tax ratables and low
costs.
Use of environmental excuses
(where not clearly valid) to deny
building permits, or to greatly
limit densities.
Exclusion by EFFECT-
Byproducts of Action
Existing misconceptions and lack
of understanding by public regard-
ing racial groups, and community/
neighborhood consequences as pro-
perty values, etc.; or outright hos-
tility.
Corporate relocation to outlying
areas which lack appropriate hous-
ing and transportation facilities;
(the impact is also felt by non-
racial minority, low-income groups);
the locating of governmental facili-
ties without housing and employ-
ment "tie-ins" (given the commut-
ing capabilities of the work force).
Crisis-oriented moratoria, which oc-
cur due to lack of prior planning
or unwillingness to undertake the
expenditures required to correct
facility deficiencies.
Lack of housing element in com-
prehensive planning process, result-
ing in inability to accommodate to
needs.
Non-use of funding availability (as
Federal/State aids), or of savings
due to operating efficiencies (as
double school sessions).
Antiquated ordinances, codes, and
regulations on local and state levels
which effectively cause the market
to respond inefficiently or inequita-
bly to housing demand.
114. The chart is reprinted with permission from NAT'L COMM. AGAINST DIsCIM-
INATION IN HOUSING & URBAN LAND INSTITUTE, FAIR HOUSING & EXCLUSIONARY LAND
USE 57 (1974). Copyright 1974 by Urban Land Institute and National Committee
Against Discrimination in Housing.
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Exclusion by INTENT-
Purposeful Practices
Unreasonable large-lot
Prohibition against
dwellings.
zoning.
multifamily
Limitation on number of bedrooms.
Large floor space requirements.
Exorbitant fee-schedules or land
dedication requirements.
Low-income housing permit or zon-
ing refusals (see also racial, by in-
tent, above).
Exclusion by EFFECT-
Byproducts of Action
Additive result of items above and
to the left, which effectively esca-
late costs of finished housing . . .
including outmoded building codes,
extravagant subdivision regulations,
and non-use of efficient innovative
design or land use approaches as
PUD's, flexible zoning, etc.
Bureaucratic and administrative de-
lays, and undue complexities in
processing.
Miscellaneous: unequal municipal
services; tax or methods to recover
all "public" costs from the new
homebuyers via "developer" fees,
etc.
Whether the disproportionality of the racial impact is of constitu-
tional significance is one of the most muddled areas of our constitu-
tional jurisprudence" 5 and often may be a mixed question of purpose
and effect. The confusion in this area of the law has achieved disas-
trous proportions."' As Professor Brest has pointed out, the "impact
of a law generally has had little or no constitutional significance inde-
pendent of a suspect operative rule. 1" 7  For example, although rules
that classify people on the basis of poverty and race are suspect, the
adoption of a tax or fee that falls more heavily on the poor does not
require a compelling justification. The Court similarly does not re-
quire a compelling justification to uphold the enactment and enforce-
ment of criminal laws that disproportionately burden particular ethnic
minorities. A requirement that decision-makers somehow assure that
all decisions have an equal effect on rich and poor and on all races
would be both impractical and undesirable."" Nevertheless, under
certain circumstances, impact alone may trigger the strict scrutiny de-
mand for an extraordinary justification." 9 The impact may fall so
heavily upon one minority as to clearly establish, even without proof
of intent, conduct that cannot be judicially approved. 120
115. Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional
Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REv. 95, 99 [hereinafter cited as Brest].
116. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1205, 1207 (1970).
117. Brest, supra note 115, at 110. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2051-
52 and n.14 where Justice White makes the same point, citing Goodman, De Facto
School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275, 300
(1972).
118. Brest, supra note 115, at 110.
119. id.
120. Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171, 1172 (5th Cir. 1972).
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Justice Stevens' concurring opinion in Davis121 presents a view
that more accurately reflects the reason for the tortured course of the
decisions in this area than does the opinion for the Court:
. . . [T]he extent to which one characterizes the intent issue as
a question of fact or a question of law. . . will vary in different
contexts.
Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be ob-
jective evidence of what actually happened rather than evidence
describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally
the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences
of his deeds. This is particularly true in the case of governmental
action which is frequently the product of compromise, of collective
decisionmaking, and of mixed motivation. It is unrealistic, on the
one hand, to require the victim of alleged discrimination to un-
cover the actual subjective intent of the decisionmaker or, con-
versely, to invalidate otherwise legitimate action simply because
an improper motive affected the deliberation of a participant in
the decisional process.
.. . [T]he line between discriminatory purpose and dis-
criminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not quite
as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume ...
[A] constitutional issue does not arise every time some dispropor-
tionate impact is shown. On the other hand, when the dispropor-
tion is as dramatic as in Gomillion . . or Yick Wo, it really does
not matter whether the standard is phrased in terms of purpose
or effect.122 (citation omitted).
Justice Stevens' formulation of the standard is more useful than that
of the Court. The Court's standard that purpose, not effect, is the
dominant constitutional concern will be easy to apply. Unfortunately,
this standard does not recognize that effect may constitute the only ob-
jective evidence of intent. Justice Stevens' approach recognizes that
the rejection of such objective evidence of intent is unrealistic. In-
deed, Justice Stevens' view led him to concur in the Court's judgment
that a neutral test to determine ability to undertake training as a police-
man was constitutional. Justice Stevens, as did Justice White, reached
this result even though cases under Title VII had held that the test
should be job-related, rather than related to a program that prepared
policemen to serve.
Although the Court in Davis emphasized that effect should be
minimized as an operative concern in constitutionality, the Court
clearly believed that the Davis test ultimately was relevant to perform-
ance and not discriminatory either in purpose or in effect.1zs The
121. 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2054 (1976).
122. Id.
123. Justice Stevens concurred in the view that the test was neutral, stating:
mhe test serves the neutral and legitimate purpose of requiring all applicants to
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Court also seemed to be strongly influenced by the fact that the police
department had systematically and affirmatively sought to enroll black
officers, many of whom passed the challenged test but failed to report
for duty.124 In spite of these manifestations of good faith purpose, the
Davis opinion looms as an attitudinal obstacle to invalidation of official
action that is otherwise neutral but that has the effect of disadvantaging
or discriminating against racial minorities. Although the ultimate re-
sult was arguably correct, the boldness of Justice White's opinion indi-
cates, at the very least, that any disproportionate effect must be sub-
stantial before the Court will find an equal protection violation based
upon effect alone. The Davis decision, therefore, may be a signal to
lower courts that they must require, in addition to proof of impact, some
evidence of purpose to discriminate-at least such purpose as might
be inferred from the disproportionate impact itself. This requirement
may also be yet another tolling bell for the "new equal protection' 25
as well as a confirmation of a new relationship between the court and
racial minorities.' 26
meet a uniform minimum standard of literacy. Reading ability is manifestly rele-
vant to the police function, there is no evidence that the required passing grade was
set at an arbitrarily high level, and there is sufficient disparity among high schools
and high school graduates to justify the use of a separate uniform test.
Id. at 2054-55.
124. Id. at 2045.
125. One expression of the concept of "new equal protection" was articulated by the
court of appeals in Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806, 814 (2d Cir. 1973)
and ignored by Justice Douglas when the case reached the Supreme Court. 416 U.S.
1, 7-8 (1974). As expressed by Judge Mansfield, the test
• ..no longer [limits courts] to the either-or choice between the compelling state
interest test and the minimal scrutiny test. . . . Faced recently with the issue un-
der similar circumstances the Supreme Court appears to have moved from this rigid
dichotomy, sometimes described as a "two-tiered" formula, toward a more flexible
and equitable approach, which permits consideration to be given to evidence of the
nature of the unequal classification under attack, the nature of the rights adversely
affected, and the governmental interest urged in support of it. Under this approach
the test for application of the Equal Protection Clause is whether the legislative
classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the statute. . . . If
the classification, upon review of facts bearing upon the foregoing relevant factors,
is shown to have a substantial relationship to a lawful objective and is not void for
other reasons, such as overbreadth, it will be upheld. If not, it denies equal protec-
tion.
Judge Mansfield relied on a seminal discussion of the "new equal protection," in
Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term, Foreword, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10-
20 (1972). But San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973),
decided a month after Judge Mansfield's embrace of equal protection activism, placed
the Supreme Court's equal protection law back on a traditional footing, and largely
undercut the more liberal tests. See Judge Timbers' dissent from the denial for rehear-
ing en banc by a tie vote Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 824-27 (2d Cir.
1973), and Judge Mansfield's reply to the dissent, id. at 827-29, which argues the mean-
ing of Rodriguez, supra, and the Supreme Court's return to a less aggressive equal protec-
tion, vindicating such commentators as A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA
OF PROCESS (1970) and Kurland, Egalitarianism and the Warren Court, 68 MIcH.
L. REv. 629 (1970).
126. See note 86 supra. Professor Karst prophetically noted that, "The best recentjudicial explanation of this new solicitude for the disadvantaged has come not from the
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The ambiguity of the reasoning behind Justice White's disagree-
ment with the court of appeals cases "to the extent that those cases
rested on or expressed the view that proof of discriminatory purpose
is unnecessary in making out an equal protection violation,' '127 is puz-
zling. Justice White's opinion did not specify whether he disapproved
the result of the cited decisions, whether he found the language of the
opinions in the "laundry list"'128 footnote too sweeping, or whether he
felt that the standard of proof for racial wrongdoing should be the crim-
inal standard of "beyond a reasonable doubt." Thus, the precedential
value of the cases in the "laundry list" footnote is nebulous.
Considering Justice Stevens' assertion that discriminatory purpose
is not always easily distinguishable from discriminatory impact, 29 anal-
ysis of the specific cases cited by the Court suggests two possibilities.
First, the activism of the last decade may have left the Court so ener-
vated that it will grapple only with the most inescapable problems,
those being only the most flagrant and unambiguous acts of racial dis-
crimination. Alternatively, the Davis decision may constitute a signal
to lower courts that an equal protection violation now requires both
proof of discriminatory impact and proof of discriminatory purpose.
Close examination of the "laundry list" of cases that Justice White
discredited in Davis does not reveal any central theme which could
have been the basis for the discrediting citation. The reference to
these cases suggests that they found equal protection violations without
requiring proof of motive, yet these cases all contained evidence of sub-
stantial discriminatory purpose. The holdings in the discredited cases,
therefore, would have been the same whether or not the respective
courts had found impact without proof of motive sufficient, because any
discussion of impact without proof of motive in these cases would have
been obiter dictum. Even if there had been no proof of motive in
these cases, the discriminatory effects alone were so substantial that use
of any standard of proof less than "beyond a reasonable doubt" would
have resulted in the courts finding constitutional violations. Justice
White's footnote in Davis, a case involving no discriminatory motive,
discrediting dicta in cases in which both substantial discriminatory im-
pact and discriminatory purposes had been established, reemphasizes
the boldness of the Davis standard for a constitutional violation.'3 0 A
Supreme Court, but from Judge J. Skelly Wright in ...Hobson v. Hansen." Karst,
Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-
Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716, 742 (1969). Professor Karst's hopes for
the adoption of a "sliding scale" of review now seem less justified, to put it mildly. In
any case, Justice White's footnote disavowal of the "impact" cases in Davis, 96 S. Ct.
2040, 2050 n.12 (1976), suggests at least that a revisionist view commands the present
court's perspective and that a purge of new equal protectionism continues apace.
127. Washington v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2050 (1976). See also note 126 supra.
128. Justice Brennan's barb. See note 106 supra.
129. 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2054 (1976).
130. See notes 86 and 126 supra.
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brief survey of the facts of each of the cases disapproved by Justice
White suggests how egregious the discriminatory impact may have to
be before the Court will find an equal protection violation based solely
upon impact.
In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency,"3 ' the first
housing decision in Justice White's "laundry list," the discriminatory ef-
fect was unusually severe. Norwalk's urban renewal program would
have resulted in virtual exile of the city's minorities.'" 2 The housing
agency, in computing housing available as an alternative to the existing
housing that was to be demolished, simply had inventoried existing
rental vacancies and assumed that minorities would have equal access
to the dwellings. The court of appeals found this approach impermis-
sible in the face of a housing market characterized by racism. The
urban renewal action also was directed solely at the minority commu-
nity. The program did not operate in a neutral fashion, dislocating
both whites and minorities. Rather, in the style of many urban renewal
programs, the essence of the plan was minority removal more than it
was urban renewal. 3 ' The plaintiff had alleged expressly that the
housing agency intended, through the combination of the challenged
project and the rampant housing discrimination, to drive minorities out
of the city. The court of appeals held that proof of the allegation
would establish a violation of the equal protection clause.'3 4 Thus, the
court of appeals relied solely upon an examination of purpose in hold-
ing adequate the allegation of an equal protection violation.
The impact of the official action in Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n,
Inc. v. City of Lackawanna3 5 was more severe than in Norwalk CORE.
In Kennedy Park Homes the mayor of a Buffalo suburb refused to sign
a sanitary sewer form that was a prerequisite for construction of a low
income housing project in a predominantly white section of the city.
The city had two other sections. One of the sections, with a population
of 8,974, housed only one non-white person. The other section con-
131. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968). Several law reviews had favorably noted the de-
cision. See, e.g., 69 COLUM. L. REV. 472, 494, 508-09 (1969); 20 SYRAcusE L. REv.
157 (1968); 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1257 (1963). The decision generally had been followed.
See, e.g., M.M. Crockin Co. v. Portsmouth Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 437
F.2d 784, 788 n.5 (4th Cir. 1971). Cf. Tondro, Urban Renewal Relocation: Problems
in Enforcement of Conditions on Federal Grants to Local Agencies, 117 PA. L. REv.
183 (1968).
132. 395 F.2d 920, 935 (2d Cir. 1968).
133. See McGee, Urban Renewal in the Crucible of Judicial Review, 56 VA. L. REV.
826, 859 (1970).
134. Procedurally, Norwalk CORE was on appeal from a grant of defendant's mo-
tion to dismiss for lack of standing, 395 F.2d 920, 925 (2d Cir. 1968). The district
court opinion, by implication, raised the question of justiciability, id. at 927. In address-
ing the question of justiciability, the court of appeals had occasion to examine the ade-
quacy of the plaintiff's allegations in support of a charge of violation of the equal protec-
tion clause. Id. at 931-32.
135. 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
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sisted of 98.9 percent non-white citizens and contained the oldest, most
dilapidated homes with the highest number of persons per dwelling unit
in the city. The black ghetto was physically separated from the rest
of the city by railroad tracks and was dominated by a steel plant. Traf-
fic access to the ghetto was limited to a single bridge over the railroad
tracks. The court of appeals found that the mayor's persistent refusal
to sign the sewer permit was discriminatory in purpose. Justice Clark,
in his opinion for the court, added that even if the "discrimination
[had] . . . resulted from thoughtlessness rather than a purposeful
scheme, the City [could] not escape responsibility for placing its black
citizens under severe disadvantage .. ". . ,16 This dicta apparently
drew Justice White's attention to the decision as one that should be dis-
credited. Justice Clark, however, had expressly found that the city had
involved itself in the mosaic of Lackawanna's discrimination. The
city's involvement was sufficient to amount to specific authorization and
continuous encouragement of racial discrimination, if not almost com-
plete racial segregation.'87 Because the plaintiffs sought to enjoy prop-
erty rights free of discrimination, and because Lackawanna's action was
inescapably adverse to the enjoyment of that right, the court of appeals
required a showing of a compelling governmental interest to overcome
a finding of unconstitutionality. 8" The court thus relied upon the com-
bined showing of purposeful discrimination and deleterious effect in
holding the defendant to the "compelling governmental interest" stand-
ard of justification for its actions.1 9
Justice White's discrediting citation of Southern Alameda Spanish
Speaking Org. (SASSO) v. Union City 4 0 must be considered in light
of his own parenthetical note that the discussion about effect is dictum.
The case involved a Chicano non-profit housing sponsor who succeeded
in obtaining passage of an ordinance rezoning a tract of land to permit
construction of a federally subsidized multi-family project. The city
council's rezoning action ultimately was nullified by a city-wide referen-
dum. The court of appeals refused to enjoin the referendum, and
136. 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970)..
137. Id. at 113, 114. Justice Clark cited Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,
365 U.S. 715 (1961) and Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) as completely under-
cutting Lackawanna's claim that no state action was involved.
138. 436 F.2d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 1970).
139. Of course, Lackawanna was unable to establish a compelling governmental in-
terest in its refusal to grant a sewer connection permit. The city had claimed that the
National Recreation and Park Association and the City's Master Plan had earmarked
the land for the housing project for recreational use. Justice Clark demonstrated that
the claim was "false," 436 F.2d at 113. The other substantial reason advanced by the
City was the inadequacy of the sewer lines. But Justice Clark found that, although the
sewer system had been grossly deficient for many years, the city had permitted nine sub-
divisions with some 450 homes in the predominantly white area of the city in which
the housing project was planned to tie into the system. Justice Clark held that the city
could not solve the sewer problem by denying blacks access to it. Id. at 114.
140, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
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upon remand the district court judge held that the referendum did not
deny equal protection of the laws. In refusing to enjoin the referen-
dum, the court of appeals observed that the case would present a sub-
stantial question if, apart from voter motive, the result of the zoning
by referendum was discriminatory.' This allusion to a hypothetical
presentation of a constitutional question not before the court was, as
Justice White recognized in Davis, merely dictum. Although this dic-
tum merely suggested that a constitutional question existed as to
whether an equal protection violation could ever be based solely upon
a showing of effect, Justice White viewed it as sufficiently dangerous
to be discredited. Because the question of whether the city had a duty
to develop a plan that accommodated the needs of its low income fam-
ilies was not before the court, the court did not offer an answer.""
The outcome in SASSO reflected a concern for free exercise of the
franchise more than any indifference to racial impact. 4 ' Because of
this emphasis on the franchise, inquiry into motivation was irrel-
evant.' 
4
Justice White's "laundry list" footnote in Davis also cites, disap-
provingly, dictum in Gautreaux v. Romney.' 5 This citation was to one
of many decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in
the litigation which lead to the Supreme Court's Gautreaux decision. In
the case that drew Justice White's disapproval, the Seventh Circuit
found that HUD had played a significant role in the administration of
segregated public housing in Chicago, and that HUD was guilty of ra-
cially discriminatory conduct in its own right.'" The effect of HUD's
action was so egregious, that ultimately a unanimous Supreme Court
(including Justice White) concurred in the affirmance of the Seventh
Circuit's metropolitan area remedy.14 7  Justice White, however, felt
impelled to denounce the Seventh Circuit's conclusion that courts
141. Id. at 295-96.
142. Id.
143. Three other recent cases also deferred to the exercise of the franchise if the
countervening interest was racial impact. First, Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321
(6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 980 (1970), which was not cited by Justice White.
Ranjel involved spot zoning by ordinance to permit a federally subsidized housing project
for lower-income blacks and Mexican Americans in a white neighborhood. A general
referendum procedure, not restricted to zoning, existed and was used to block the project.
Second, James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) upheld a state constitutional provision
that permitted public housing site selection to be subject to approval by referendum. See
text accompanying notes 205-211 infra. Most recently, City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976) sustained a city charter provision requires refer-
endum approval of any changes in land use, see text accompanying notes 217-222, infra.
144. The court of appeals in Ranjel v. City of Lansing, 417 F.2d 321, 324 (6th Cir.
1969) concluded that initiative and referendum are such an important part of the state's
legislative process and are sufficiently grounded in neutral principles, that they should
be exempt from constraints by the U.S. Constitution.
145. 448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
146. Id. at 739.
147. 96S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
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should not examine a purported good faith motive when the effect of
discrimination was as pronounced as the effect in Gautreaux.148
Crow v. Brown, another case which was partially disapproved by
Justice White in Davis, stated in dictum that "in the absence of super-
vening necessity, any . . . action or inaction intended to perpetuate or
which in effect does perpetuate" residential segregation with attendant
school segregation and dislocations of jobs and housing cannot stand.149
The result in Crow, however, did not depend upon the alternative
phrase which suggested that the court could find a constitutional viola-
tion based solely upon the effect of certain actions. Officials of Fulton
County, Georgia had refused building permits for two low-rent public
housing projects in the Atlanta suburbs, after they learned of the type
of housing involved, even though they had previously rezoned the par-
cels for apartment development. The district judge found that the offi-
cials refused to issue the building permits for the projects solely be-
cause the occupants of the developments would have been blacks."10
Thus, the case was one involving both motive and impact.
The last case on Justice White's disapproval list in Davis is the
widely noted and discussed Hawkins v. Town of Shaw."' In this in-
stance the discriminatory purpose was overshadowed by the severely
148. The Seventh Circuit relied on dictum in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Author-
ity, 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1963), which announced that "[i]t is of no consolation to an
individual denied the equal protection of the laws that it was done in good faith," 448
F.2d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 1971).
Because Gautreaux only addressed the permissibility of a metropolitan area remedy,
Justice White's discrediting of dictum in an early stage of the Gautreaux litigation pre-
sents the possibility that the Gautreaux situation would not constitute a violation of
equal protection under the Davis standard. Apparently Justice White does not feel that
the circumstances surrounding the discrimination in Chicago by CHA and HUD were
sufficiently egregious to make the racial impact, rather than the discriminatory purpose,
the critical factor in a finding of unconstitutionality. See Washington v. Davis, 96 S.
Ct. 2040, 2049 (1976).
149. 332 F. Supp. 382, 392 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affd 457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972).
150. In affirming, the court of appeals per curiam stated: "Of the 14,000 units of
public housing, 55.7% are located in areas which are 90% to 100% black, and another
19.4% in areas which are 70% to 90% black." 332 F. Supp. at 383.
This policy causes and perpetuates residential racial segregation. The record is
clear that the County officials denied building permits . . . for the purpose and
foreseeable result of continuing the present pattern of racial segregation.
457 F.2d 788, 790 (1972).
151. 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1972), affd en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
The case has been hailed as a seminal opinion, see Daye, Role of the Judiciary in Com-
munity Development and Housing: A Suggested Analytical Method, 52 J. URBAN LAW
689, 741 (1975). See also Note, Equalization of Municipal Services: The Economics
of Serrano and Shaw, 82 YALE L.J. 89 n.8 (1972), describing the number of articles
in the field as "legion"; Comment, The Evolution of Equal Protection-Education,
Municipal Services, and Wealth, 7 HAav. Civ. RiGHTS-Civ. LIB. L. REv. 103 (1972); and
Note, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw-Equal Protection and Municipal Services: A Small
Leap for Minorities but a Giant Leap for the Commentators, 1971 UTAH L. REv. 397,
suggesting that "[A]lthough the commentators have heralded Hawkins v. Town of Shaw
as a significant equal protection case, it adds little to established principles"-mainly be-
cause the court was able to find a suspect classification based on race.
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discriminatory effects of the inaction of town officials. In Hawkins the
defendant town had totally failed to provide municipal services to black
sections of the municipality. The plaintiffs demonstrated by over-
whelmingly conclusive statistical evidence that there was almost a com-
plete lack of service to the black communities and almost total service
in the white communities. 152 The court of appeals, in commenting on
the lack of proof of a purpose to discriminate in a suit alleging unconsti-
tutional racial discrimination, noted that "actual intent or motive need
not be directly proved . . . ."'I But in Justice White's own words,
"the discriminatory impact . . . for all practical purposes demon-
strate[d] unconstitutionality because in [these] circumstances the dis-
crimination [was] very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds." '54
Thus, Justice White's disapproving citation to Hawkins emphasized that
he would not find a constitutional violation based solely on effect even
in the clearest and most egregious case of neglect.
Finally, neither last nor least on Justice White's list in Davis was
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights.15 The discriminatory impact in Arlington Heights was pro-
nounced. Village officials in metropolitan Chicago's most segregated
suburb 5 ' refused to rezone land leased by a religious group to an open-
housing organization that planned the construction of a federally subsi-
dized multi-family project. The open-housing organization planned the
development as a cluster of two-story townhouses, no higher than the
surrounding single family homes. Unfortunately, no classification for
townhouses existed and the development, therefore, required rezoning
by the Village. Arlington Heights already had rezoned 60 parcels of
land for large commercial multi-family projects, 53 of them adjacent
to single family homes. Prior to the open-housing organization's rezon-
ing request the Village had amended its zoning plan "dozens of times
to permit development of thousands of high-rent apartments adjacent
to single-family neighborhoods," 5 7 with many of those requests consist-
ing of situations almost identical to the request at issue. The distin-
152. Approximately 98% of all homes fronting on unpaved streets and 97% of all
homes not served by sanitary sewers in the town were in black neighborhoods, and the
town had recently installed high intensity lighting fixtures exclusively in white neighbor-
hoods, 437 F.2d 1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971). See also Note, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 397,
401.
153. 437 F.2d 1286, 1291-92 (5th Cir. 1971).
154. 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2049 (1976). As John Hart Ely has said of Gomillion, "it
would have taken authenticated motion pictures of the coins being flipped or the computer
running amok [to have demonstrated a lack of discriminatory motive]; surely no matter
of legislative history, no matter how carefully doctored, could have served," Ely, Legis-
lative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1254
(1970).
155. 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1030 (1975), on 1976-
77 docket, 45 U.S.L.W. 3013 (July 27, 1976).
156. Id., Respondent's Brief at 12.
157. Id., at 3.
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guishing characteristic of the developments for which the Village
granted rezoning was that those developments were effectually for
whites only.
The Village of Arlington Heights had been highly successful in
maintaining its socio-ethnic homogeneity. The Seventh Circuit found
that, among municipalities in the Chicago area with more than 50,000
residents, Arlington Heights was the most residentially segregated com-
munity and also contained the most racially exclusionary housing
stock.1" 8 A 1970 population census revealed that less than 0.1 percent
of Arlington Heights' residents were black. The percentage of blacks
in Arlington Heights had declined between 1960 and 1970 while the
percentage of blacks in the entire Chicago metropolitan area increased
from fourteen percent to eighteen percent.1 59  Evidence was offered
that in the absence of racial discrimination in Arlington Heights, if the
housing choice of blacks were based on cost alone, blacks would occupy
five percent of the existing housing stock of the Village. Although this
figure is significantly lower than the percentage of blacks in the Chi-
cago metropolitan area, it would represent an increase of over 100
times the present number of black residents in the Village.160 Thus
the Village's rejection of the rezoning application for the low income
housing development had the effect of perpetuating the existing hous-
ing segregation. Furthermore, the rejection of the rezoning applica-
tion was clearly motivated by massive public opposition to the develop-
ment-much of it thoroughly documented in racially explicit letters and
petitions which sought to thwart efforts to integrate the community.16'
The bare citation of Arlington Heights by the Supreme Court in
Davis62 superficially indicates that the court of appeals held purpose
somewhat less important than effect in ascertaining a constitutional
violation. The Seventh Circuit's opinion, however, does not permit a
simplistic classification as being on one side or the other of the tradi-
158. 517 F.2d 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1975).
159. Id.
160. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 517 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1030 (1975), Respondent's Brief at 12-13, based
on an exhibit prepared by demographer/urbanologist Pierre de Vise.
161. Among the letters was one printed in the Arlington Heights Herald while the
hearings for the rezoning were underway before the Plan Commission. The reprinted
letter contained this passage:
Concerning your editorial, "Housing: An Ignored Issue": It isn't ignored, it's un-
wanted. We do resist low-income housing because it is a ploy to export blacks from
Chicago to integrate the suburbs.
The official minutes of the Plan Commission hearing revealed that a
-Mr. Zviagzne ... was placed under oath. He stated that they have the right to
choose their friends ....
He explained that in Brazil there is a lot of mixing between colors and he
hoped that someday we would live together like that, too, but not by being pro-
voked-no shotgun wedding has lasted very long, and that is what he felt was hap-pening. ...
Id. at 17-19.
162. 96 S. Ct. 2040, 2050, n.12 (1976).
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tional purpose/impact dichotomy.1  In building upon an earlier opin-
ion,'" the Seventh Circuit held that the Village of Arlington Heights
had exploited the problem of racial discrimination by allowing itself to
become an almost 100 percent white community. Furthermore, by re-jecting the project the Village barred the only present hope of making
even a small contribution toward eliminating the pervasive problem of
segregated housing.'8 5  The Village's conduct, therefore, was held to
have discriminatory effects that required compelling justification. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit did not hold simply that racial
disparity without more violated the fourteenth amendment. 6 The
overall pattern of residential segregation in the Arlington Heights area
was of prime importance to the court in its decision. The Village offi-
cials effectively were reinforcing private actions to perpetuate segrega-
tion. This reinforcement by the Village of private discriminatory ac-
tion logically should result in a sharing of liability for the discriminatory
effect.' The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that settled
163. Land use expert Fred P. Bosselman saw the Seventh Circuit's decision in Ar-
lington Heights as evidence of the willingness of
[m]idwestern federal appeals courts . . . to tackle the problem of metropolitan
housing segregation while federal courts elsewhere in the country have been running
for cover ...
This is in dramatic contrast to the 2d, 6th and 9th circuits, all of which have
recently upheld local exclusionary zoning decisions on grounds that the communities
had no obligation to look beyond their own boundaries in determining housing
needs.
Bosselman, Comment on Metropolitan Housing Devel. Corp. v. Village of Arlington
Heights, 27 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIGEST 12 (No. 7, 1975). The other midwestern
circuit alluded to by Bosselman is the Eighth Circuit, see United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). See text
accompanying notes 249-57 infra. The "narrow view" cases are Ybarra v. City of Los
Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974); Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing
Authority, 500 F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974); and Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d
1078 (2d Cir. 1974).
164. In Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974), the Seventh
Circuit held that a builder had violated the prohibition against racial discrimination in
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), by constructing and selling homes to blacks at prices inflated
because the blacks were not able to purchase in white areas. The mere fact that the
defendant did not create the problem, did not necessarily mean that he could ignore it
or take advantage of it. The case is discussed in Note, Curbing Exploitation in Segre-
gated Housing Markets: Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 10 HARV. CiV. RIGHTS-CrV.
LIB. L. REv. 705 (1975).
165. 517 F.2d 409, 414-15 (7th Cir. 1975).
166. Indeed, the Court explicitly declared that James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137(1971), supported its analysis that "racial disparity alone as it relates to the project un-
der consideration does not amount to racial discrimination," 517 F.2d at 413.
167. Kushner & Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation After Milliken v. Bradley: The
Case for Land Use Litigation Strategies, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 187, 208-12 (1975); see
Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1974) as evidence of the con-
cept of "shared liability". For Kushner & Werner, Clark is a linchpin of the Court of
Appeals opinion affirmed by Gautreaux in that the "widespread private residential segre-
gation shown in Clark was used as support for the proposition that there was evidence
of suburban discrimination. Thus public agencies were held liable for policies which
perpetuated private discriminatory acts," Kushner & Werner, supra at 209.
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practices of state officials may, by imposing sanctions or withholding
benefits, transform private predilections into compulsory rules of be-
havior as effectively as legislative pronouncements. 168 Village officials'
refusal to rezone, under circumstances in which they normally would
have rezoned, effectively aborted a development that would have in-
creased the number of minority residents by over 1,000 percent. 16 9
Their refusal clearly served to perpetuate existing racial segregation.
Whether or not this action was motivated by antipathy towards blacks,
a compelling justification was required to justify the interruption by Vil-
lage officials of private efforts to desegregate. The record in Arlington
Heights, which is currently on certiorari to the Supreme Court, clearly
is not wanting for evidence of racial motive. Thus, the Seventh Cir-
cuit's opinion leaves open the opportunity for affirmance either on a
theory of discriminatory effect or on a theory of discriminatory motive
or both.
The Supreme Court, therefore, is at a crossroad, perhaps not un-
like that reached in the post-reconstruction era-another time of de-
clining national commitment to minority needs and concerns.170  Gau-
168. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 168 (1969).
169. 517 F.2d 409, 414 (7th Cir. 1975).
170. Recent opinions of the Court that affect blacks have a quality of deja vu that
is especially ironic in the bicentennial year and 100 years or so after a similar national
reaction to minority progress. Speaking of the 1870's, Professor BardoIph has written:
In their program to frustrate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, con-
servative southerners, especially after 1872, were aided by the Republican party and
many northerners who had wearied of the Reconstruction fiasco, who had come to
doubt that the earlier objects of Radical Reconstruction could--or even should-
be realized, and who were more and more disposed to re-establish national harmony
by sacrificing the Negro.
This new drift was powerfully assisted by the nation's highest tribunal. De-
cisions involving the amendments and legislation growing out of them steadily
weakened the recently drafted guarantees of Negro rights. Moved partly by a de-
termination to check the shift in power from the states to the nation, partly by a
legalistic insistence upon the letter of the law and the clear commands of legal jus-
tice before the vaguer claims of social justice, and partly by public racial attitudes,
the Court developed several principals [sic] of constitutional construction.
It decreed that the amendments applied only to measures taken by the states
themselves, . . . that if a law was not on the face of it clearly discriminatory, the
Court would not presume to determine whether it was in effect more burdensome
to blacks than to whites; ....
These doctrines were partially defined in a cluster of decisions beginning with
the Slaughter House Cases of 1873 [83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 395 (1873)] and culminat-
ing in the Civil Rights cases ten years later.
Another long stride toward the restoration of white supremacy in the South
during the twilight of the Reconstruction program came in the vigorous declaration
by the Supreme Court in United States v. Cruikshank [92 U.S. 542 (1875)] that
the Fourteenth Amendment did not put ordinary private rights under the protection
of the nation except as against state action.
THE CIVIL RiGHrs REcoRD: BLACK AMEuCANS AND THE LAW, 1849-1970, 58-59, 62 (R.
Bardolph ed. 1970).
Another outline of the Supreme Court's "nullification" of previous attempts to lib-
erate blacks appears in Maslow & Robinson, Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for
Equality, 1862-1952, 20 U. CH. L. REV. 363, 370-73 (1953).
Additional discussion of this distant era that has a depressingly striking resemblance
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treaux-type segregation probably (and hopefully) is on the wane. The
metropolitan area remedy established in Gautreaux would be an empty
promise were the Court to hold expressly, in the area of racially dis-
criminatory housing practices, that discriminatory motive or purpose
must be proven before relief will be extended. Further litigation will
be fruitful in providing truly equal protection only if the Court is pre-
pared to follow the lead of those circuits that have examined closely
the reality of racial impact.
B. Standing Barriers to Desegregated Housing
The need for more expansive views of equal protection also has
special force because of the Supreme Court's recent standing cases.
The decisions in Warth v. Seldin17 1 and Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org.'7 2 have reduced considerably the number of citi-
zens entitled to prove the discriminatory nature or disproportionate im-
pact of governmental action requisite to establishing a violation of equal
protection. Thus, Gautreaux's promise of desegregation may be hol-
low not only because the discrimination necessary to trigger relief is
difficult to prove, but because the Court has significantly reduced the
class of persons entitled to raise the claim. Not everyone who is ex-
cluded from the suburbs is part of the relatively small percentage
of residents in public housing projects. 7 Warth and Simon v.
of what was known in the 1972 Presidential campaign as the "Southern Strategy" or the
search for a "new majority" appears in D. KING & C. QuicK, LEG.AL AsPECTS OF THE
CWIL PGmHs MovEMErr 9-13 (1965) and DISCIuMNATION AND THE LAw 5-14 (V.
Countryman ed. 1965). An excellent compilation of the relevant legal as well as his-
torical material on the era and a summary of some of the more obscure decisions, is
contained in EMERSON et al., 2 PoLrnCAL AND CxmL LIBERTIES IN THE UNrrED STATES
1399-1402 (1967). Among the historical classics on the period is that of W. E. B. Du-
BoIs, BLAcK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA (1955). See also MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA 226 (1944) and Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
50 MicH. L. REv. 1336, 1339 (1952), which describes the Supreme Court's "directed per-
version of what the abolitionists tried to write into the Constitution" as a "judicial coup
d'etat."
Cf. Justice White's dissent (joined by Mr. Justice Rehnquist) in Runyon v. Mc-
Crary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2604 (1976), for a very recent expression of the kind of legalistic
view of the post Civil War legislation that resulted in the relegation of blacks to second-
class citizenship. For an earlier expression of the same abstract legalism by Justice
White, see his widely-criticized, indeed notorious, opinion in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
202 (1965), discussed in Comment, The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531, 539-
46 (1970).
171. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
172. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976) [here-
inafter referred to as Simon v. E.K.W.R.O.].
173. As of June 30, 1969 there were 2.6 million public housing residents. HUD,
Justification of Low-Rent Public Housing, Renewal and Housing Assistance Programs,
reprinted in Hearings before Subcomm. of Comm. on Appropriations, House of Repre-
sentatives, Independent Offices and Dept. of Housing and Urban Development Appro-
priations for 1971, 91st Cong. 2d Sess., pt. 3, at 191, 201 (1970). See generally id.
at 166-203. CI. MANDELIER, HousNG Sunswxas IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND
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E.K.W.R.O., and the court of appeals cases, like Petaluma '74 and Evans
v. Lynn 175 may limit the Court's earlier efforts to provide a forum for
racially and politically oppressed minorities. 176  Now plaintiffs not only
must solve the conundrum of justiciability, 1" but they also must have
suffered, in strictest terms, "injury in fact."178
6 (1973): "Nationally, only about three or four percent of all rental housing is publicly
owned .. "
Indeed, "the public housing program was never very large: since 1937, when it be-
gan, only about one million units have been built. The vast majority of poor people
did not (and do not now) receive housing aid, other than through welfare...." Gans,
A Poor Man's Home Is His Poorhouse, N.Y. Times, March 31, 1974, § 6 (Magazine),
at 20. This should be contrasted with England where two-thirds of all rental housing
is publicly owned. MANDELKER, id. at 7.
174. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976) was resolved in part on a standing analysis. In Petaluma
a builders association was not permitted to assert third party claims by low income per-
sons allegedly denied the right to travel by exclusionary municipal practices of Petaluma,
which had imposed a 500-unit maximum on construction in the city.
175. 376 F. Supp. 327, rev'd, 537 F.2d 571, 573-80 (2d Cir. 1975), alrd on rehear-
ing en.banc, 537 F.2d 571, 589-612 (1976). Evans denied standing to plaintiffs who
lived outside the town of New Castle, N.Y. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin HUD water
and sewer grants because of HUD's failure to evaluate racial residential segregation in
the New Castle area. The court held that, even if the plaintiffs were in the "zone of
interest" of the statute, they lacked the "injury in fact" required by article III of the
U.S. Constitution, 537 F.2d at 590-98. In reaching this result, the court reasoned that
injunctive relief would not improve the plaintiffs' housing status.
176. Cf. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412
U.S. 669 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SCRAP]; Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972). The decision
in SCRAP was the occasion of a dissent by Justices White and Rehnquist, and Chief
Justice Burger, who ultimately prevailed in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
Dissenting in Warth, Justice Brennan said:
[The Court's decision] will be read as revealing hostility to breaking down even
unconstitutional zoning barriers that frustrate the deep human yearning of low-in-
come and minority groups for decent housing they can afford in decent surround-
ings.
Id. at 528-29.
177. What Justice Powell called "prudential limitations" on the exercise of federal
jurisdiction, 422 U.S. at 498, Justice Brennan saw as "outmoded notions of pleading andjusticiability." Id. at 520. Cf. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), especially
the argument of the Solicitor General attacking "government by the Judiciary," id. at
753; and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), and A. BE.RLE, THE THRE FACES
OF PowER vii (1967) viewing the Supreme Court as a "revolutionary committee."
178. Justice Douglas used the "injury in fact" test in Association of Data Processing
Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) and Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
In Data Processing, Justice Douglas stated that, in determining standing, "[t]he first
question is whether the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury
in fact, economic or otherwise," id. at 152. A majority of the Court required "allega-
tions of individualized injury" as a limitation on the "injury in fact" concept in Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 736 (1972). However, it has been argued that "at least
in its broadest form ... it amounted to no more than a ruling on a technical defect
of pleading. It would present no great difficulty for the Sierra Club to allege that it
represents its members rather than the public, and to find among its members users of
Mineral King who would regard it as despoiled by development" and thereby make the
sufficient allegation of "individualized injury." Scott, Standing in the Supreme Court-A
Functional Analysis, 86 HAv. L. REv. 645, 667 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Scott].
Cf. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 1667,
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By raising the barriers to standing, the Court commits plaintiffs
attacking racially discriminatory exclusionary land use practices to pro-
tracted trench warfare-war that depends on a "Fifth Column" within
the ranks of the suburban enclaves. In Warth several low income
members of racial and ethnic minority groups filed suit against the town
of Penfield, alleging that the town's zoning ordinance effectively ex-
cluded persons with low and moderate incomes from living in the town.
A local builders association sought to intervene, claiming that the exclu-
sionary zoning deprived members of the association from the potential
profits of constructing low and medium-income housing in Penfield.
The Court found that neither group had standing to litigate the claims.
None of the individual persons had demonstrated that the exclusionary
zoning harmed them. Nor did any of the individuals show that they
would benefit from the requested relief. The builders association
failed to obtain standing because its members, with one exception, had
not attempted to build in Penfield.
Thus, the Court's standing test required both the excluded citizens
of Buffalo, as well as the builders of low-income housing, to demon-
strate that they could surmount all the various practical obstacles to the
construction of housing developments. Ironically, many of the practical
obstacles derive from the exclusionary zoning practices. Among the
obstacles that the plaintiffs would have to show a strong possibility of
overcoming to satisfy the Court's standing requirement are bureaucratic
obstacles such as successfully processing a subsidy application through
HUD. 179  Warth's requirement of a preliminary showing of success in
completing highly technical and complex tasks raises a formidable bar-
rier to obtaining judicial relief. The Court's restrictive view of the
proper scope of the article I11110 standing requirement will preclude
full adjudication of many worthy claims.""'
1737-47 (1975). Professor Scott's suggestion that Sierra Club was not "a restrictive turn
in the evolution of standing doctrine", id., now seems less than prescient after Warth's
exclusion of plaintiffs who cannot allege "a distinct and palpable injury" 422 U.S. at 501,
and also that they "personally would benefit in a tangible way from the courts' interven-
tion," id. at 508, [emphasis added]. However, as Professor Scott shows, "most of the
concern over plaintiff's standing in terms of the minimal requirements of Article III, or
"pure" standing, is empty. . . . If plaintiff did not have the minimal personal involve-
ment and adverseness which Article III requires, he would not be engaging in the costly
pursuit of litigation." Scott, supra, at 674.
179. Local municipalities interpose bureaucratic obstacles of their own, presumably
not intended to be exclusionary. "Building industry studies show that governmental fees
comprise 3% of the price of a home-and when governmental red tape delays the start
of construction, inflation, holding costs and other expenses can force the price up an-
other 2% a month. For the median-priced $51,300 home, that's $1,026 for every month
of delay." Belinkoff, Consumer Pays for Government Delays, L.A. Times, June 6, 1976,
Pt. VII, at 7, col. 1. The article describes the 18 months and 36 different offices it
took to obtain approval for a 188-acre, 188-home hillside tract in Los Angeles.
180. U.S. CONrST. art. III, § 2.
181. Ironically, a Pennsylvania court, a state with judges in the vanguard of the
assault on exclusionary zoning, also denied relief on grounds of nonjusticiability to low-
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In Simon v. E.K.W.R.O.18 2 the "injury in fact" requirement was
applied to plaintiffs arguably in the "zone of interests" of the Internal
Revenue Code's preferential tax treatment provisions for hospitals that
service disadvantaged patients. An organization of indigents argued
that an Internal Revenue Service regulation, which granted preferential
treatment to hospitals that provided indigents only with emergency
services discouraged the institutions from meeting the entire needs of
the poor. The Supreme Court reaffirmed Warth and dismissed the
claim. Instead of dismissing the claim for lack of ripeness, 183 the Court
unnecessarily stretched to dismiss the claim for lack of standing. In
his opinion for the Court, Justice Powell explained that the plaintiffs
had not shown that the alleged injury was fairly attributable to the
I.R.S. regulations instead of to other factors. Although the I.R.S. reg-
ulation provided an incentive for hospitals to discriminate against in-
digents, the plaintiffs did not satisfy the injury in fact requirement for
standing to litigate the validity of the regulation. In order to meet the
standing requirement, the plaintiffs would have had to show that the
elimination of the tax incentive would have resulted in some hospitals
admitting indigents for non-emergency care so that they could continue
obtaining preferential tax treatment. In the Court's view, "unadorned
speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal judicial power. "184
Apparently, in order to be heard on the merits of a claim that attacks
a complex structure of discrimination, a plaintiff must establish not only
that the specific action being attacked is part of the structure, but also
that it is the keystone, without which the entire structure will fall.
In short, the Court has taken such a restrictive view of standing
that general assaults on segregated communities border on the impos-
income persons seeking access to a county by way of general rezoning in Commonwealth
v. County of Bucks, 8 Pa. Commnw. 295, 302 A.2d 897 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1130 (1974), afj'g., 22 Bucks Co. L. Rep. 179 (1972). The case preceded but was not
cited in Warth. The court reaffirmed Pennsylvania authority authorizing judicial invali-
dation of exclusionary zoning practices, but found that the Bucks County plaintiffs lacked
the specific property interests present in such cases as National Land and Investment Co.
v. Easttown Township Board of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) and
Girsh Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970). The court also was reluctant to
become a "superplanning agency" assuming oversight of the County planning commis-
sion and 54 separate municipalities, and making initial policy determinations of a "kind
clearly for nonjudicial discretion" with an entire "lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards" for the task. 22 Bucks Co. L. Rep. at 188, 302 A.2d at 904-05.
Bucks and Warth are discussed in Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases
of Exclusionary Zoning, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 760, 779-783 (1976).
182. 96 S. Ct. 1917 (1976).
183. The decision was probably not ripe for judicial determination since respondents
had failed to secure administrative determinations as to how the new regulation would
be applied and what effect it would have on different categories of hospitals. Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan, joined by Mr. Justice Marshall, would have disposed of the case for lack
of ripeness. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from "further obfuscation of the
law of standing . . . unnecessary when there are obvious and reasonable alternative
grounds upon which to decide this case." Simon v. E.K.W.R.O., 96 S. Ct. 1917, 1928
(1976) (dissenting opinion).
184. 96 S. Ct. at 1927.
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sible. The court appears to allow only "specific project" standing, in
which someone within the enclave sells to an outside developer whose
low-income housing project is stymied by a specific law or regulation.
The obvious result is that those communities that "hang together" and
that rely on a broad base of discriminatory actions are safe from center
city intruders. Either the outsiders will be unable to establish that in-
jury in fact does exist or they will be unable to relate the injury to a
keystone action so that an injunction will be effective in terminating
the discrimination. Mr. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Warth, vividly
captured the anomaly of the Court's position:
* * . [t]he portrait which emerges from the allegations and
affidavits is one of total, purposeful, intransigent exclusion of cer-
tain classes of people from the town, pursuant to a conscious
scheme never deviated from. Because of this scheme, those in-
terested in building homes for the excluded groups were faced
with insurmountable difficulties, and those of the excluded groups
seeking homes in the locality quickly learned their attempts were
futile. Yet, the Court turns the very success of the allegedly un-
constitutional scheme into a barrier to a lawsuit seeking its invali-
dation. In effect, the Court tells the low-income minority and
building company plaintiffs they will not be permitted to prove
what they have alleged-that they could and would build and live
in the town if changes were made in the zoning ordinance and
its application-because they have not succeeded in breaching,
before the suit was filed, the very barriers which are the subject
of this suit.' 8 5
The Court's increasingly restrictive standing requirements may be
obscuring the underlying problem-that of a political question bar.186
Justice Powell's suggestion in Warth, that citizens who are dissatisfied
with provisions of zoning laws need not overlook the availability of the
normal democratic process, 8 7 supports the contention that the Court
may be disguising as a standing requirement a political bar to justici-
ability. Unfortunately, the democratic process which Justice Powell
185. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 523 (1975).
186. See Sager, Burnt Bridges: Retreat of the Federal Judiciary from Land Use
Litigation, 27 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIGEST 7 (No. 11, 1975) [hereinafter cited as
Sager].
The question of standing as the sufficiency of the plaintiff's interest in the case is
sometimes blended with discussions of justiciability, but "courts should talk about stand-
ing only when their decisions are based on standing considerations." Scott, supra note
178, at 684, citing K. DAVIs, 3 ADMIISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.00-4, at 723 (Supp.
1970).
187. 422 U.S. at 508, n.18. Black despair at the available "normal democratic
processes" has been encapsulated by S. CARMICHAEL & C. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER:
THE POLMCS OF LIBERATION IN AMERICA 173 (Vintage ed. 1967): "Under the present
institutional arrangements, no one should think that the mere election of a few black
people to local or national office will solve the problem of political representation ...
The fact is that the present political institutions are not geared to giving the black mi-
nority an effective voice."
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suggests plaintiffs may utilize to obtain relief is the same unresponsive
democratic process that ended in the urban uprisings of the 1960's.18
Although the Court did not address the political question in Simon v.
E.K.W.R.O., the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Petaluma
impliedly recognized the political question barrier when it proclaimed
that the pressing housing needs in metropolitan areas must be resolved
in the legislature, not in the federal court.189
Thus, while the Court sanctions a metropolitan area remedy in a
federally funded racially segregated housing project, the Court is not
likely to approve equally dramatic relief in litigation that has a greater
chance of breaking down residential segregation. More pervasive and
effective schemes of racial segregation that are perpetuated by exclu-
sionary land use practices require, in the Court's view, proof of motive
by a select group of plaintiffs.
III. THE CONTRADICTION BETWEEN DESEGREGATION
ORDERS AND LOCAL LAND USE CONTROLS
The barriers of proving motive and of establishing standing to sue,
though formidable, are dwarfed by the barriers created by the Court's
deference to local autonomy. In recent years the Court has protected
zealously the rights and powers that are accorded to local government
entities either under federal or state housing statutes or under existing
land use laws. The sweeping relief permitted in Gautreaux'9 0 ap-
pears to conflict with the manner in which the Court thus far has re-
acted to local land use practices. From James v. Valtierra'91 in 1971
to City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.,192 which followed
Gautreaux by only a few weeks, the Court's treatment of local land use
practices has been one of abdication and abstention.
Very few land use controversies have been resolved by Supreme
Court opinions. Out of. the thousands of court decisions involving zon-
ing disputes between 1926, the year of Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 9" and 1969,'1 4 the Supreme Court rendered only two such
188. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 5
(1968): "The frustrations of powerlessness have led some Negroes to the conviction
that there is no effective alternative to violence as a means of achieving redress of griev-
ances, and of 'moving the system.'" Cf. WATTS: THE AFrERMATH 55 (P. Bullock ed.
1969).
Political and "community" leaders are targets of deep mistrust and suspicion
[in the ghetto]. . . . Negro politicians, as a rule, are not trusted much more than
are the white. The pervasive feeling is that the "leaders" and the "spokesmen" have
drifted away from Watts, and that they serve their own interests before those of
the community.
189. Sager, note 186 supra.
190. Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1550 (1976).
191. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
192. 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976).
193. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
194. N. WILLIAMS, AMICAN LAN PLANNING LAw Vol. I, at vii (1975) puts the
number of zoning decisions in.this period at more than 10,000.
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decisions, both in 1928.111 In 1974 the Court affirmed the constitu-
tionality of sociological zoning in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas.198
During the 46-year silence on zoning issues, however, the Court de-
cided other significant cases involving land use policies. In 1954 the
Court upheld the power of local government entities to use eminent
domain to condemn land for redevelopment. 197  Subsequently, in
James v. Valtierra,9 s the Court affirmed the right of local communities
to decide the fate of low income housing projects by referendum. Most
recently, in Eastlake'99 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of a mandatory referendum that subjected zoning variances granted by
planning officials and the city council to approval by the electorate.
The Court's first zoning decision, Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,2 °0 was a carefully thought out accommodation between
earlier conceptions that private property was subject to the police power
only when such things as fire and disease required individual interests
to be subordinated to the general security of the community and more
modem views about regulation of the urban environment. Euclid sanc-
tioned a flexible view of the police power. This expanded view of the
police power allowed the exclusion of specified uses from various parts
of a city if in accordance with a well-considered plan. The expanded
police power was based upon both an extension of the power to protect
against fire and disease and the new trend to exclude nuisances.
The Supreme Court's endorsement of segregation of uses caused
a dramatic change in state court attitudes. State courts subsequently
upheld not only height and area regulations, but also restrictions on
use.201  Limitations on the newly expanded police power, however,
195. Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928) and Seattle Title and Trust
Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928). Indeed, during the six U.S. Supreme Court terms
between the 1949-50 term and the 1954-55 term, appeals were dismissed or petitions
were denied in 21 cases involving zoning and local planning. See Johnson, Constitu-
tional Law and Community Planning, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 199, 208 (1955). The
period from 1971 through 1976 has also seen the Court's deferral to inferior tribunals.
See chart at note 223 inf ra.
196. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
197. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The decision was "but the culmination
of more than a half century of judicial laissez faire-ism in eminent domain." McGee,
Urban Renewal in the Crucible of Judicial Review, 56 VA. L. REv. 826, 832-33 (1970).
See Dunham, Property, City Planning and Liberty, in LAw AND LAND 28, 35-37 (C.
Haar ed. 1964) in which the argument is made that Berman liberated planning so that
its decisions could be subjected to the tests of the market place.
198. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
199. 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976).
200. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
201. E. BAssETr, ZONING 46-47 (1936). As state court attitudes shifted, so did state
legislatures. "By the end of 1927, zoning laws had been enacted by some forty-five
states. . . . At the close of 1930 authority for the adoption of zoning ordinances had
been extended to municipalities in forty-seven states, and in the forty-eighth, the general
home rule for provisions of the constitution had been judicially construed to grant au-
thority for . . .zoning ordinances.... .C. HAAR, LAND USE PLANNING 173 (2d ed.
1971).
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were promptly announced by the Court. In Nectow v. City of Cam-
bridge202 the Supreme Court declared a zoning ordinance unreasonable
as applied to a particular tract of land. In Seattle Title & Trust Co.
v. Roberge20 3 the Court struck down a consent provision in a zoning
ordinance that delegated legislative power (and hence a veto) to the
neighbors of a landowner who sought a particular use. Thus, the zon-
ing power that first had been held constitutional in 1926 was well de-
fined by two limits on its use by 1928.
The recent Supreme Court cases, however, have permitted local
control of land use practices, even when the local law suggests a
parochialism inconsistent with the planning and political premises of
Euclid.20 4  For example, James v. Valtierra upheld the power of local
communities to determine by referendum whether low-rent public
housing could be constructed. 05 The use of a referendum as a zoning
device effectively permits the affluent, and usually white, citizens to
decide whether low-rent public housing should be provided for less af-
fluent, typically minority, citizens. 20 6  Because the referendum in Val-
tierra did not contain an express racial classification, the Court declined
202. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
203. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
204. See Amicus Brief of Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders, Am. Soc'y of Planning Offi-
cials, and Am. Inst. of Planners, at 4-11, City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc., 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976). Among the contributors to the exceptionally well-written
and documented, but unavailing, brief was Richard F. Babcock, author of THE ZONING
GAME: MUNICIPAL PRACTICES AND POLICIES (1966) and (with E. Bosselman) EXCLU-
SIONARY ZONING: LAND USE REGULATION AND HOUSING IN THE 1970's (1973).
Although Euclid's "rationale is the basic source of the philosophy of zoning as a
protectionist device," J. BEUSCHER et al., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 529 (2d
ed. 1976), the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act published by the U.S. Department
of Commerce in 1922 and adopted by 45 states within a year of Euclid required that
zoning regulations conform to a comprehensive plan. See note 201 supra. The master
plan requirement has been interpreted to have "intercommunity" requirements, Borough
of Cresskill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441 (1954). "Under such
a theory, it would be necessary to consider conditions in adjoining municipalities and
adjust planning and zoning activities in accordance with these conditions." Haar, In Ac-
cordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1163 n.28 (1955). State
high courts in Pennsylvania and New Jersey recently have required that developing mu-
nicipalities regulate land in a manner "which permits residential development for a 'fair
share' of its region's housing need." Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision: Expand-
ing the Boundaries of Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 2. See, e.g., Urban League
of Greater New Brunswick v. Borough of Cateret, 142 N.J. Super. 11, 359 A.2d 526
(1976). Cf. Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378
N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975).
205. 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
206. One commentator has taken a less dim, perhaps even sanguine, view of
Valtierra, arguing that the case suggests "a greater concern to distinguish laws that are
easily dubbed racist from those with no more to condemn them than that they happen
at times to affect racial minorities disproportionately." Lefcoe, The Public Housing Ref-
erendum Case, Zoning and the Supreme Court, 59 CAL. L. REV. 13,84, 1457 (1971). A
similarly benign view of Valtierra is contained in Note, The Equal Protection Clause and
Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE UJ. 61, 73-75 (1971).
For a more critical and somewhat more realistic view of Valtierra see The Supreme Court
1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 122, 126-134 (1971).
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to extend to the poor the protections previously extended to racial mi-
norities20 7 who are more disproportionately represented in the ranks
of the poor.208  Though Valtierra has been regarded as an attempt by
the Court to avoid the thicket of economic inequality, 0 ' a position later
reinforced by San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,2 1 0
the impact of the case clearly will be greater on non-white households
than on white households.21'
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,21 2 the Court's first zoning de-
cision in 46 years, the Court expanded the scope of Euclid to approve
sociological zoning. The Court upheld an ordinance which restricted
land use to one-family dwellings and defined the term "family" to ex-
207. The Court distinguished Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), which in-
validated an Akron, Ohio city charter amendment requiring that fair housing ordinances
be subject to electorate approval before becoming law-a practice required by the city
only for anti-discrimination legislation. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
208. "The data on family incomes according to ethnic origin reveal only three major
groups with incomes below average-blacks, people of Spanish heritage and American
Indians." Thurow, The Economic Progress of Minority Groups, CHALLENGE, March-
April, 1976, at 21. This situation is not improving.
The upgrading of income levels of black families which was associated with the nar-
rowing income gap which occurred in the 1960's was not as evident within the last
four years. From 1969 to 1973, the median income of black families . . . did not
grow, . . . The overall income position of black families relative to white fami-
lies, as measured by the income ratio, has declined within recent years.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF THE BLACK POPULATION
IN THE UNITED STATES 1-2 (1973). This report also indicates that 19 percent of all
non-white families make less than $3,000 per year, while only 7 percent of white families
fall in this income group. Moreover, only 12 percent of non-white families make more
than $15,000, while 26 percent of white families fall in this group. Id. at 19. See also
NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BuILINo THE AmERIcAN CITY 45 (1968),
stating: "In 1967, 41 percent of the nonwhite population was poor, compared with 12
percent of the white population. Nonwhites thus constitute a far larger share of the
poverty population (31 percent) than of the American population as a whole (12 per-
cent). Moreover, the nonwhite proportion of the poverty population has been increasing,
slowly but steadily, since the first racial count was made in 1959: it was 28 percent
then, and 32 percent by 1967."
209. See, e.g., NAT'L COMM. AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING AND URBAN LAND
INSTITUTE, FAIR HOUSING & EXCLUSIONARY LAND USE 35 (1974); Comment, James v.
Valtierra: Housing Discrimination by Referendum?, 39 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 120-124
(1971).
210. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
211. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971). Valtierra was relied on by Judge
Friendly in English v. Town of Huntington, 448 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1971), an opinion
that refused to halt the eviction (and consequent exile) of black and Puerto Rican resi-
dents in an urban renewal-related code enforcement effort that did not provide for relo-
cation. With characteristic detachment, Judge Friendly observed:
It is an unpleasant fact of life that [substandard housing] will be occupied by
poor people, and a still more unpleasant one that black and Puerto Rican citizens
are over-represented in that group. Yet the Supreme Court [in Valtierra] held that
the mere fact that a requirement, otherwise proper, may have a greater impact on
the poor, does not render it invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.
Id. at 324.
But for a more narrow reading of Valtierra, confining it to referendum, see Sisters
of Providence of St. Mary of the Woods v. City of Evanston, 335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D.
Ill. 1971).
212. 416U.S. 1 (1974).
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clude entities having more than two unrelated persons living and cook-
ing together as a single housekeeping unit. According to the opinion,
the police power is not confined merely to the elimination of filth,
stench, and unhealthy places. In the Court's view, the police power
is ample to allow designation of zones where family values and the
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air operate to create a sanctuary
for people.21 In Belle Terre the Court went far beyond Euclids con-
clusion that the assessment of comprehensive regulatory schemes re-
quires the evaluation of a wide range of factual and technical data.21 4
Although Belle Terre involved an issue in which the ends-means ques-
tion could have been competently assessed by the Court without it sit-
ting as a "zoning board of appeals," '215 the opinion is extraordinarily
permissive given the impact, if not the burden, on the first amendment
freedom of association and the constitutionally guaranteed right to pri-
vacy imposed by the Village's land use law.21
Any thought that Belle Terre might have reflected concessions to
a "one-zone" community217 was quashed by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Eastlake.218  In that decision the Court returned to the majori-
tarian premises of Valtierra by upholding the right of voters in the com-
munity to pass on the validity of every proposed land use change. The
Ohio supreme court found that the requirement of voter ratification of
land use changes constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative
213. 416 U.S. at 9. Ironically, the decision was authored by Justice Douglas--one
of the great champions of first amendment rights. His devotion to the environment may
explain in part his deference to local efforts to plan and/or curb growth at the sacrifice
of values of privacy and self-expression. Justice Douglas also wrote Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954), discussed in note 197 supra.
214. The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 119, 128 (1974).
215. 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall conceded
that the court should "afford zoning authorities considerable latitude in choosing the
means by which to implement" the purposes of zoning laws, but added that "deference
does not mean abdication." Id. at 14.
216. Id. at 15.
"The Belle Terre decision [was] a bitter disappointment to those who have opposed
parochial land use regulation and the exclusionary impact such regulation necessarily en-
tails." Comment, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: Belle Terre Is A Nice Place to Visit
-But Only "Families" May Live There, 8 URBAN L. ANNUAL 193, 195 (1974). "Es-
pecially distressing to proponents of expanded housing opportunity was the cavalier man-
ner in which the Court disregarded the new equal protection reasonableness test the Sec-
ond Circuit panel had employed to invalidate the ordinance." Ackerman, The Mount
Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of Zoning Reform, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
For a discussion of the new equal protection test adopted by the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals, see notes 125-26 supra. Land use law and planning commentator, Donald
Hagman has called Belle Terre his "least favorite U.S. Supreme Court Case," Hagman,
Petaluma: A Comment, 27 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIGEST 11, 12 (No. 11, 1975). See
also Hagman, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: A Comment by Dale Hagman, 26 LAND
USE L. & ZONING DIGEST 3 (No. 6, 1974).
217. As suggested by Judge Jasen in Berenson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d
102, -, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 681 n.2 (1975).
218. 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976).
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power that denied the landowner due process of law.219 Justice Stern
of the Ohio supreme court, however, noted the exclusionary dimensions
of the ratification procedure. In a concurring opinion Justice Stern rec-
ognized that zoning provisions such as those in Eastlake have the single
motive of building walls against the ills, poverty, racial strife, and even
the people of urban areas. Numerous suburbs of Cleveland had
adopted requirements of mandatory referendums for approval of zon-
ing changes in a thinly veiled attempt to perpetuate the existing de
facto divisions between black and white, rich and poor. 2 0 Justice
Stern also found that the purpose of the referendum provision was an
attempt to render change difficult and expensive under the guise of
popular democracy-an attempt that he characterized as being
"crudely apparent on its face."22' In spite of Justice Stern's comments,
not a single Justice of the United States Supreme Court addressed the
exclusionary aspects of the Ohio referendum procedure. Chief Justice
Burger, speaking for the Court in Eastlake, found that the referendum
process, as a basic instrument of democratic government, does not vio-
late the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment when applied
to a rezoning ordinance.222 Thus, the Court preserved the sanctity of
the franchise; but it did so at the cost of the minority groups that fre-
quently seek, and desperately need, to change the status quo, but who,
by definition, cannot muster the votes needed to win a referendum.
Whenever the Court has had occasion to consider land use prac-
tices with exclusionary, and hence discriminatory implications, it has
supported the power of local communities to bar access to minorities.
Unfortunately, the Court's disclaimers of any purpose to bar minority
access do not alter the exclusionary, discriminatory effect of the deci-
sions. Since James v. Valtierra was decided in 1971, the Court has
had opportunities to address land use issues in at least 18 cases.22 Of
219. Forest City Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324
N.E.2d 740 (1975).
220. Id. at 200, 324 N.E.2d at 749 (Stem, J., concurring).
221. Id. at 199, 324 N.E.2d at 748.
222. 96 S. Ct. 2358 (1976).
223. The chart below outlines the activity of the Supreme Court in land use related
cases involving the growth, or lack thereof, of municipalities. Because a denial of certio-
rari purportedly has no precedential value, the Court's disposition of many of these cases
may indicate no more than the Court's deference in this area.
TERM &
DISPOSI-
TION CASE SUMMARY
1970-71 James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. Supreme Court affirmed constitution-
Opinion 137 (1971). ality of holding referendums to ap-
prove zoning changes.
Cert. Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. Court of appeals required munici-
Denied City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d pality to permit low income housing
108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. de- for blacks in predominantly white
nied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). area.
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those 18 opportunities, the Court has rendered decisions in only five
cases, Valtierra, Belle Terre, Warth, Gautreaux, and Eastlake. Gau-
1971-72 * * * NO CASES * * *
1972-73 Schere v. Township of Free-
Cert. hold, 119 N.J. Super. 433, 292
Denied A.2d 35 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 931 (1973).
1973-74 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
Opinion 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
Cert. Commonwealth v. County of
Denied Bucks, 8 Pa. Cmwlth. 295, 302
A.2d 897 (1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
Cert. Gautreaux v. City of Chicago,
Denied 480 F.2d 210 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1144
(1974).
1974-75 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490
Opinion (1975).
Cert. Cornelius v. City of Parma,
Granted, 374 F. Supp. 730 (N.D. Ohio
Remanded 1974), vacated, 506 F.2d 1400(6th Cir.), cert. granted, 422
U.S. 1052 (1975) remanded
521 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1975).
Cert. Mahaley v. Cuyahoga Metro-
Denied politan Housing Authority, 500
F.2d 1087 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1108
(1975).
Appeal Mahoney v. Board of Appeals
Dismissed of Winchester, 316 N.E.2d 606(Mass. 1974), appeal dismissed,
420 U.S. 903 (1975).
Cert. Citizens Comm. for Faraday
Denied Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d
1065 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied 421 U.S. 948 (1975).
Cert. United States v. City of Black
Denied Jack, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1042 (1975).
1975-76 Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. CL
Opinion 1538 (1976).
Opinion City of Eastlake v. Forest
Enterprises, Inc., 96 S. Ct.
2358 (1976).
Cert. Constr. Indus. Ass'n v. City of
Denied Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 934 (1976).
Superior Court of New Jersey, Ap-
pellate Division, invalidated minimum
lot size restriction found to be beyond
practical, reasonable utilization.
Supreme Court upheld validity of
one-family zoning of an entire mu-
nicipality.
Commonwealth Court of Pennsyl-
vania denied standing to nonresident
low income individuals who chal-
lenged exclusionary zoning ordinance.
Court of appeals held that district
court may properly order housing
authority to disregard state law re-
quiring city council approval of low
income housing sites.
Supreme Court interpreted article III
standing requirement to bar nonresi-
dents from challenging validity of
exclusionary zoning ordinance.
Supreme Court vacated and remanded
in light of Warth. District court
originally found that white plaintiffs
did not have standing to challenge
denials of building permit to low
income blacks. See also Cornelius
v. Parma infra.
Court of appeals held that municipali-
ties may decide if they need low
income housing, and need not accept
proffered federal funds for low in-
come housing.
Supreme Court of Massachussetts up-
held constitutionality of a statute
providing for relief from local restric-
tions hampering construction of low
income housing.
Court of appeals held that, because
low income status is not a suspect
classification and there is no constitu-
tional right to a certain quality of
public housing, a municipality need
not justify a decision not to proceed
with low income housing with a com-
pelling state interest.
Court of appeals held that a zoning
ordinance which bans multiple family
housing has a racial effect and 'vio-
lates the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. § 801 (1970).
Supreme Court approved metropolitan
wide remedy against HUD and local
housing authority.
Supreme Court upheld constitution-
ality of local referendum held to ex-
clude low income housing.
Court of appeals upheld growth-lim-
iting zoning restrictions.
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treaux was the only opinion of the five that did not have an exclusion-
ary effect.2
A Gautreaux order in a public housing or other subsidized housing
case is, as the Court confesses in Gautreaux, at the mercy of local com-
munities. Local communities already may have, or may enact, consti-
tutional zoning laws that bar the very kind of housing essential to deseg-
regating the metropolis, low-income and multifamily developments.
A housing authority properly may discharge its constitutional duty by
deciding to locate low-income housing in a community bordering a
metropolis. If the community, however, has a Valtierra or Eastlake
Cert. County Bd. v. God, 216 Va.
Denied 163, 217 S.E.2d 801 (1975),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1088
(1976).
Cert. Board of Supervisors v. Wil-
Denied liams, 216 Va. 49, 216 S.E.2d
33 (1975), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 300 (1975).
Appeal Southern Burlington County v.
Dismissed Township of Mount Laurel, 67
N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713 appeal
dismissed, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
Cert. Cornelius v. City of Parma,
Denied 521 F.2d 1401 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955
(1976).
Cert. Village of Arlington Heights
Granted v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.),
cert. granted, 423 U.S. 1030
(1975).
Virginia supreme court upheld finding
of arbitrary and capricious refusal to
rezone property for apartment build-
ing.
Virginia supreme court upheld finding
that county board's refusal to rezone
for apartment was unreasonable.
New Jersey supreme court held that
a municipality may not, by a system
of land use regulation, make it phy-
sically and economically impossible to
provide low income housing.
Court of appeals remanded to district
court in light of Warth.
Court of appeals held that failure to
rezone for low income housing consti-
tuted a violation of equal protection.
See text accompanying notes 155-70
supra.
224. During the last term, probable jurisdiction was noted in a variation on Belle
Terre. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 96 S. Ct. 1723 (1976), an appeal from a
$25.00 fine and a 5 day jail sentence imposed on a grandmother because she permitted
her two sons and her two grandsons to live in her home. The presence of her 7 year
old grandson John Moore, Jr. was held to violate an ordinance which defined "ftmily"
so as to restrict occupancy in a single-family dwelling to "not more than one dependent
married or unmarried child of the nominal head of the household or of the spouse of
the nominal head of the household and the spouse and dependent children of such de-
pendent child." In an unpublished opinion, an Ohio court of appeals affirmed the con-
viction 2-1, holding that the case was controlled by Belle Terre. The dissent held that
Belle Terre was not applicable and that the definition of family was so restrictive that
it was suspect because it invaded the family's privacy. The Ohio supreme court affirmed
without opinion.
The case is yet another opportunity for the Court to impose some limit on the power
of municipalities to regulate land use. The Court did not find freedom of association
impinged by the Village of Belle Terre, but an ordinance that imposes a restriction on
the number of related persons who may live under the same roof may bring into play
a combination of rights that may cause the Court to take more than the passing look
it gave the Belle Terre law. Indeed, in Belle Terre Justice Douglas expressly found that
the case involved no fundamental right such as a right of privacy, 416 U.S. 1, 7 (1974).
Thus, though the Court rejected the freedom of association argument presented in Justice
Marshall's dissent, the Court may require a compelling justification before it will permit
a city to determine which lineal descendant may or may not live in the same house.
See, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 HARv. L REv. 119, 122-123 (1974).
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plebescite, or has the kind of restrictive zoning upheld in Belle Terre,
then the promise of desegregation is at the pleasure of the community
whose very existence often is a reaction to inner-city desegregation.
Even if the suburb's actions and ordinances are clearly in violation of
the equal protection clause, Warth and its progeny may terminate litiga-
tion of a desegregation dispute at an early stage.
IV. THE PROMISE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES
Despite the "Catch-22"22 5 effect of the Court's zoning and land-
use decisions, the possibility still exists that although the Constitution
may not by itself prove to be a significant instrument of metropolitan
desegregation, the Civil Rights Statutes of the Reconstruction era and
of the 1960's may open both the courthouse as well as the suburban
door. These statutes may answer both the problems of standing and
of substance posed by the Court's decisions in housing and in land use.
The recent Supreme Court decision in Runyon v. McCrary226 may
be a signal that the Court applies a different set of assumptions in situa-
tions that bear on racial discrimination-whether covert or overt--de-
pending upon whether the claim is constitutional or statutory. In Run-
yon the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1981227 prohibits racial discrimina-
tion in contracts for private school education. 228  The defendant private
school in Runyon had denied plaintiffs admission solely on the basis
of their race. In holding such action to be proscribed by § 1981, the
Court followed the rationale and spirit of § 1982 as expressed in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 221 Jones had established that sections 1981
and 1982 were designed "to prohibit all racial discrimination whether
or not under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated therein.
. . .,"230 The Court in Runyon expressly adopted this language and
applied it to § 1981 .211 Justice Stevens filed a separate concurring
225. See generally J. HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961), describing a proviso or condition
which renders a right or privilege meaningless or void.
226. 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976).
227. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and
to no other.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides that:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.
The common derivation of both § 1981 and § 1982 from the Civil Rights Act of
1866, 14 Stat. 27, mandated this result, Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2593-94
(1976).
229. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (42 U.S.C. § 1982 held to prohibit private discrimination
in the sale or rental of housing).
230. 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968).
231. 96 S. Ct. 2586, 2594 (1976).
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opinion in Runyon28 2 in which he perhaps captured the essence of both
Jones and Runyon when he stated:
. . . [E]ven if Jones did not accurately reflect the sentiments of
the Reconstruction Congress, it surely accords with the prevailing
sense of justice today.
The policy of the Nation as formulated by the Congress in
recent years has moved constantly in the direction of eliminating
racial segregation in all sectors of society.2 33
The Court's liberal reading of sections 1981 and 1982, and Justice
Stevens' reliance on the policy and the mores of modern society23 4 re-
flect an approach to statutory claims which contrasts sharply with the
Court's treatment of equal protection claims.2 5  Such liberal construc-
tion, however, is consistent with the Court's pronouncement that the
courts will give Reconstruction era civil rights legislation "a sweep as
broad as [the] language." 23 6
Liberal construction of civil rights legislation, however, has not
been limited to civil rights legislation of the Reconstruction era. In
1972 the Supreme Court, in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co.,237 accorded liberal construction to Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, a statute written in language as broad as Congress could
have made it.23a  In Trafficante a unanimous Court upheld the right
of housing complex tenants to sue under Title VIII because blacks were
excluded from the complex. 2 9  The district court and the court of ap-
peals held that only the objects of discriminatory housing practices (i.e.
excluded blacks) could sue under Title VIII. 240  Justice Douglas' opin-
ion for the Court found that the language defining an aggrieved person
as "any person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory
housing practice" 241 encompassed whites who had not been discrim-
232. Id. at 2603. (Justice Stevens concurred in the result of Runyon and a reaffirm-
ance of Jones although he expressed the belief that Jones had been incorrectly decided.)
233. Id. at 2604 (Stevens, J., concurring).
234. Id.
235. See text accompanying notes 85-170, supra.
236. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971).
237. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
238. Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553, 557 (E.D. Mich. 1973). The 1968 Civil
Rights Act, passed within a week of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.,
declared "fair housing" to be the national policy of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 3601(1970). Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act outlawed discrimination in the sale,
rental, and financing of housing. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970). The Congressional declara-
tion of intention to stamp out racist housing practices ended almost 100 years of silence
by Congress on the issue. The Supreme Court's far-reaching decision in Jones v. Alfred
H. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 415-417 (1968) has held Title VIII and the 1866 Civil Rights
Act to be alternative paths to the goal of fair housing. The subsequent case of Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 388 (1968) established that Title VIH did not preempt state
and local remedies.
239. 409 U.S. 205, 212 (1972). The plaintiffs were a white tenant and a black ten-
ant of the housing complex charged with discriminatory rental policies. Id. at 206.
240. Id. at 208.
241. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (1970).
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inated against. Justice Douglas liberally construed legislative history,
which he characterized as "not too helpful, 242 in reaching the conclu-
sion that the proponents of the legislation had recognized that parties
who were not the direct objects of discrimination also had an interest
in ensuring fair housing.2 3  Although discriminatory housing practices
damage members of minority groups most severely, the "person on the
landlord's blacklist is not the only victim of discriminatory practices; it
is . . . 'the whole community.'""" Justice Douglas' broad construc-
tion of legislative history compelled the result in Trafficante of a liberal
standing requirement under Title VIII. 245
The standing limitations imposed by the Court in 1975 in Warth
v. Seldin248 do not change the result in Traflicante. Justice Powell's
opinion in Warth conceded that "Congress may grant an express right
of action to persons who otherwise would be barred by prudential
standing rules. ' 247  Warth also recognized that Congress may create
a right of action, either expressly or by clear implication, by which per-
sons may have standing to enforce the legal rights and interests of
others.24a  Furthermore, Congress may allow persons to invoke the
general public interest in support of their claim. Because Trafficante
holds that anyone who can complain to HUD about housing discrimina-
tion can sue in the courts, Title VIII suits provide a means to assure
that attacks on discriminatory land use practices are heard on the
merits. Whether Title VIII provides a viable alternative to constitu-
tional claims, however, depends on the substantive provisions of Title
VIII and whether the discriminatory actions thwart the national policy.
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in United States v. City of Black
Jack249 establishes evidence of the substantive potential of Title VIII.
In Black Jack the court of appeals held that a Missouri city had vio-
lated Title VIII by passing a zoning ordinance prohibiting development
of multiple family dwellings. 25°  The ordinance was passed shortly
after area residents had petitioned the county council to incorporate
what was previously an unincorporated part of St. Louis County. In-
corporation of the area and passage of the ordinance were clearly the
result of an attempt to halt a low to moderate income integrated hous-
ing development. The court of appeals stated that under Title VIII
242. 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
243. Id. at 210-11.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 212 (White, Blackmun, Powell, JJ., concurring) (the concurring opinion
noted that plaintiffs would not have standing under article III, absent the Civil Rights
Act of 1968).
246. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). See also text accompanying notes 171-89 supra.
247. 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
248. Id.
249. 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). For some
unknown reason Black Jack has been largely unnoticed in the legal literature.
250. ld.
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"effect, and not motivation is the touchstone, in part because clever
men may easily conceal their motivations."251  Although the record
contained evidence to support the Government's contention that the or-
dinance was enacted for the purpose of excluding blacks, the court did
not base its finding of a violation of Title VIII on the evidence of im-
proper purpose.25 2 The court premised its holding on the effect the
action had in depriving blacks of access to housing on a nondiscrimina-
tory basis. The limitations of the ordinance would have foreclosed 85
percent of the blacks living in the metropolitan area from obtaining
housing in Black Jack. This limitation would have been especially
harsh because 40 percent of the blacks in the metropolitan area were
then living in substandard or overcrowded units.255 The court found
this effect to be particularly egregious because segregated housing in
the St. Louis metropolitan area was found to be the result of deliberate
racial discrimination in the housing market both by the local real estate
industry and by agencies of the federal, state, and local governments.254
The record contained ample proof that many blacks would have lived
in the development that the ordinance prohibited. The ordinance
would have acted to perpetuate segregation in a community that was
currently 99 percent white.255 In light of these factors, the court held
that the plaintiffs had established a prima facie case under Title VIII
and that the burden shifted to the City of Black Jack to demonstrate
that the ordinance furthered a compelling government interest. 56 A
shifting of the burden of proof upon a showing of discriminatory effect
provides Title VIII claims a major advantage over equal protection
claims.15T
In Arlington Heights2 5 a theory similar to that applied in Black
251. Id. at 1185.
252. Id. at n.3.
253. id. at 1186.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. It should not go unreported that though the city lost the battle in the court of
appeals, it apparently won the war to halt housing integration. In the companion case
of Park View Heights Corp. v. City of Black Jack (E.D. Mo., No. 71-6-15(A)), dis-
cussed in The Potomac Institute, Inc., Metropolitan Housing Program, Memo 76-1, at
2 (Jan. 28, 1976), an agreed order was entered January 5, 1976 obligating the city to
pay the non-profit sponsor of the proposed interracial development $450,000. In turn,
the sponsor is conveying the site of the development to the city. The sponsor's capitula-
tion apparently was influenced by HUD's notice that its 1970 § 236 set-aside for the
proposed project would expire in January, 1976. However, the city is prohibited from
changing the multi-family zoning on the site without Justice Department consent. Thus,
there is the possibility that a new developer might come forth, and, if ever-soaring con-
struction costs permit, construct units similar to those originally planned. But once
again serious questions arise about the practical adequacy of judicial relief in exclusionary
land-use litigation. See Note, The Inadequacy of Judicial Remedies in Cases of Exclu-
sionary Zoning, 74 MIcH. L. REv. 760 (1976).
257. See text accompanying notes 85-170, supra.
258. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., - U.S. -,
was argued before the Court on October 13, 1976, 45 U.S.L.W. 3302 (U.S. Oct. 19,
[Vol. 1976
DESEGREGATED HOUSING
Jack has been urged upon the Supreme Court, an alternative theory
to the equal protection violation found by the court of appeals. 259
Washington v. Davis260 suggests that motivation might be important in
determining whether a party has violated the equal protection clause.
Under the rationale of Black Jack, however, violations of Title VIII,
like violations of Title VII, may be established by a demonstration of
discriminatory impact without evidence of motivation. According to
Justice Powell, the purpose of Title VII is "to eliminate those discrim-
inatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens."' 26 ' The prohi-
bition on discriminatory employment practices applies to all devices
that operate to exclude blacks, no matter how neutral those devices are
on their face.262 The relevant language of the Fair Housing Act and
Equal Employment Opportunity Act are similar-Title VIII prohibits
all housing practices performed "because of race" 26 8 and Title VII pro-
hibits employment practices performed "because of such individual's
race." 264 These statutory similarities and the arguments that prevailed
in Black Jack may persuade the Court in Arlington Heights to require
a compelling justification for the refusal of the Village to rezone the
controversial parcel, solely because of the segregative effect of the ac-
tion (or inaction). The refusal of the Village of Arlington Heights to
rezone for the low income development when it had rezoned similar
parcels "dozens of times to permit development of thousands of high-
rent apartments" for whites,265 clearly contravenes § 817 of the
Fair Housing Act of 1968 which prohibits interference with the right
to equal housing.266 If the Court adopts the alternative theory argued
in Arlington Heights and finds a violation of Title VIII without a show-
ing of motivation, then Title VIII will encompass both the elements of
liberal standing and of substantive law necessary to become a major
tool for the elimination of discriminatory housing practices. If, how-
1976), reviewing 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 94, 155-
69, supra.
259. Respondent's Brief at 38-49, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Dev. Corp., - U.S. -, reviewing 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
260. 96 S. Ct. 2040 (1976). See text accompanying notes 85-170, supra.
261. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973).
262. Id. at 806, interpreting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
263. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1970).
264. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l), (2) (1970). Section 2000e-2(a)(2) was
amended in 1972 to cover applicants for employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2) (Supp.
V, 1975).
265. Respondent's Brief at 3, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Dev. Corp., - U.S. -, reviewing 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975).
266. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1970) provides:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person
in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed,
or on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise
or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or
3606 of this title. This section may be enforced by appropriate civil action.
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ever, the Court interprets the substantive scope of Title VIII narrowly,
then suits under Title VIII are likely to be no more advantageous to
the victims of discrimination than are suits brought under the equal pro-
tection clause.
V. THE COURT, REGIONAL PLANNING, AND
RACIAL DISPERSION
Although the Supreme Court's barriers to standing and general
unwillingness to intervene in local zoning decisions may undercut the
significance of Gautreaux, the Court has taken a positive view of the
benefits and importance of regional planning and racial dispersion.
The Court's opinion in Gautreaux, if not an imprimatur, is at least an
accession to federal policy designed to desegregate housing in metro-
politan areas. Gautreaux also appears to foster regional planning
schemes26 7 that encourage "fair-share"26 8 strategies to integrate pre-
267. Regionalism-the consideration by a community in its land use planning of its
relationship to nearby or surrounding areas-has been defined as ". . . the area from
which, in view of the available employment and transportation, the population of the
township would be drawn, absent invalidly exclusionary zoning." Oakwood at Madison,
Inc. v. Madison Twp., 128 N.J. Super. 438, 441, 320 A.2d 223, 224 (1974).
The most common application of regional considerations to local land use controls
has involved a three-step procedure: first, an appropriate housing region is defined
encompassing the areas under challenge, and other relevant housing supply areas;
second, the housing needs of members of households working and living in this re-
gion are approximated and compared with actual and potentially available housing
supplies; and third, disparities are identified, and responsibility for eliminating or
ameliorating them allocated to the challenged areas through some implicit or ex-
plicit notion of fair share.
Burchell, Listokin & James, Exclusionary Zoning: Pitfalls of the Regional Remedy, 7
URBAN LAWYER 262, 267-8 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Burchell, et al.]. The seminal
cases are Concord Twp. Appeal, 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Girsh Appeal, 437
Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), and National Land and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd.
of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965). The recent landmark case of
Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151,
336 A.2d 713 (1975) marks the current highwater mark of judicial sanction of regional-
ism. The most important, indeed pathbreaking, scholarly discussion of regionalism is
contained in Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the
Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969). A flood of literature has followed. See, e.g.,
Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of Zoning Reform,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1.
268. The concept of "fair-share" has evolved from planning funded by the federal
government under the Comprehensive Planning Assistance Program for Non-Federal
Public Works, known commonly as the Section 701 program, 40 U.S.C. § 461 (1970),
as amended, 40 U.S.C. § 5461 (Supp. IV, 1974). Section 701 of the Housing Act of
1954 led to the creation of regional planning bodies which, as a result of the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1968, must include a housing element as part of compre-
hensive land use plans, 40 U.S.C. § 461(a) (1970) (Housing and Urban Development
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 601, 82 Stat. 528), amending 40 U.S.C. § 461(a)
(1964) (Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, § 701, 68 Stat. 640). Allocation plans to dis-
perse minority housing opportunities throughout the planning body's domain have
emerged from these housing elements. Since the initial plan was adopted in the Dayton,
Ohio area in 1970 by the five-county Miami Valley Regional Planning Commission, sev-
eral plans have been developed by regional planning agencies. A recent discussion of
a fair-share case history is contained in Moskowitz, Regional Housing Allocation
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dominantly white suburbs. Indeed, one important aspect of Gautreaux
may be the extent to which it affirms the present day popularity of "re-
gionalism" in urban planning, particularly as a strategy to alleviate ra-
cial segregation. 269  Despite the Court's position in cases that dispro-
portionately, although arguably without motivation, disadvantage racial
minorities,27° when the Court was confronted in Gautreaux with unal-
loyed racism in public housing it effectually lent its considerable weight
to federal policies to breakup inner city racial concentrations. To re-
state an old aphorism: never underestimate the power of a United
States Supreme Court decision-no matter how apparently modest. 271
Plans: A Case History of the Delaware Valley Regional Plan, 7 URBAN LAWYER 292
(1975). See also Listokin, Fair-Share Housing Distribution: Will it Open the Suburbs
to Apartment Development?, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 739 (1974) and Rubinowitz & Dennis,
School Desegregation Versus Public Housing Desegregation: The Local School District
and the Metropolitan Housing District, 10 URBAN L. ANNUAL 145, 152 n.32, 152-157
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Rubinowitz & Dennis].
According to H. Franklin, D. Falk, & A. Levin, authors of IN-ZONING, A GUME
FOR POLICY MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LANI USE PROGRAMS 158-159 (1974), fair-share
formulas are comprised of the following factors in determining housing obligations
within a given area or region: (1) number of low and moderate-income households in
a subjurisdiction; (2) available employment or employment growth; (3) population; (4)
extent of deficient housing; (5) per capita fiscal capacity of a subjurisdiction through
valuation or wealth; (6) capacity of school system within a subjurisdiction to absorb ad-
ditional children; (7) opportunity for growth as measured by land, size, or availability
of water and sewer facilities; and (8) growth in residential units.
A fair share plan does not assure, however that subsidized housing will be built in
or dispersed throughout every community. High land costs and restrictive land use
regulations may still render subsidized construction financially impractical in many
areas.
Kleven, Inclusionary Ordinances-Policy and Legal Issues in Requiring Private Develop-
ers to Build Low Cost Housing, 21 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1432, 1436 (1974).
269. ". . . [Rlegionalism is increasingly being viewed as the 'St. George' slayer of
the exclusionary zoning 'dragon,'" Burchell, et al. supra note 267, at 262. The exclu-
sionary zoning dragon "has been accused of producing a cornucopia of social evils, e.g.,
denying blacks suburban employment opportunities, intensifying inner-city school segre-
gation, jointly reinforcing and furthering the social, racial, and cultural schism of Ameri-
can society," id.
270. See text accompanying notes 85-170 supra.
271. Often an opinion has an impact beyond the problem before the Court. In B.
BrTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 124 (Vintage ed. 1973), the point is made
that proposed legislation to compensate blacks for past slavery and discrimination finds
some support in "the Supreme Court's endorsement of racial classifications in its recent
school desegregation opinions which goes a long way-an unexpectedly long way-
toward the acceptance of a 'remedial' racial code." Professor Bittker's book, of course,
preceded the Court's procedural disposition (indeed evasion) in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974) and its recent apparent willingness to grapple anew with the problems
of affirmative action programs in Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 18 Cal. 3d 34,
553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), order stayed pending petition for certiorari, 45
U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Nov. 16, 1976). On the general problem of preferential, compen-
satory and/or remedial governmental action for blacks, cf. Kaplan, Equal Justice in an
Unequal World: Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw.
U.L. REv. 363 (1966); Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REv.
235 (1971); and Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82
HARv. L Rav. 1294, 1315 (1969), which argues that Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer, 392
U.S. 409 (1968), "would seem to raise special treatment for Negroes to the level of a
'neutral principle' in the Constitution."
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The unanimity of the judgment in Gautreaux and Justice Stewart's
significant use of federal regulations has highlighted the impropriety
of HUD's appeal272 from the Seventh Circuit's decision and has rebut-
ted the erroneous assertion in the Solicitor General's brief that federally
subsidized housing programs depend on local community approval.2 73
The opinion provides federal housing and planning officials with added
force to overcome prior assertions about the lack of wisdom of desegre-
gation policies in urban planning, such as were made by Secretary Hills
when she proclaimed that:
The undue concentrations of poor people in a central city may
only be capable of mitigation on a region-wide basis.
. . . [T]he Act itself embodies a concept of regionalism, ne-
cessitated by the modem realities of regional growth and develop-
ment.274
Gautreaux could have a catalytic effect on the implementation of
federal statutes and administrative regulations fashioned to widen the
housing opportunities of racial minorities. Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 196427 prohibiting racial discrimination in federally assisted
programs and Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968276 directing
the administration of HUD programs in a manner that affirmatively fur-
thers fair housing are fundamental to federal policy.277 As the Court
noted, the 1964 Civil Rights Act was implemented by 1967 HUD reg-
ulations controlling siting of low-rent housing so as to expand the op-
272. See note 51 and accompanying text supra.
273. Petitioner's Brief at 29-34, Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976). The
contention was thoroughly rebutted by Respondent's Brief at 53-55. See text accom-
panying notes 294-303 infra.
274. HUD News Release, May 28, 1975, Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Secre-
tary Carla A. Hills to Annual Meeting of the National Association of Regional Councils
at 2, in Boston, Mass.
Mrs. Hills' statement has as a precedent a declaration by Richard M. Nixon which
ordained that HUD "and other agencies administering housing programs . . . will ad-
minister their programs in a way which will advance equal housing opportunity for
people of all income levels on a metropolitan areawide basis," statement of President
Richard M. Nixon, Federal Policies relative to Equal Housing Opportunity, June 11,
1971 which appears in 7 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTs 892, 901
(1971).
Indeed, in one phase of Gautreaux, HUD itself submitted a statement by then Sec-
retary George Romney stating that,
mhe impact of the concentration of the poor and minorities in the central city
extends beyond the city boundaries to include the surrounding communities. The
city and the suburbs together make up what I call the 'real city.' To solve prob-
lems of the 'real city,' only metropolitan wide-solutions will do.
Record Document 283, Attachment 6, Memorandum 2, at 2, Gautreaux v. Romney, 363
F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
275. Section 601, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970) (78 Stat.
252).
276. Section 808(e)(5), Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d)(5) (1970)
(82 Stat. 84).
277. See text accompanying notes 225-66 supra.
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portunities of racial minorities to locate outside urban ghettos.27 The
1968 Civil Rights Act was implemented both with project selection cri-
teria which gave priority to proposals that promised to alleviate racial
impact in housing and also with affirmative marketing requirements
for developments aided by HUD.2 79  Significantly, the Court in Gau-
treaux interpreted the 1974 Housing and Community Development Act
in a manner that complements and supports prior legislation in this
area. First, the Court acknowledged the Congressional findings that
urban communities face critical problems which stem partly from the
concentration of lower income persons in central cities and that spatial
deconcentration of housing opportunities for lower income persons is
a primary objective of the law.2"' Second, the Court declared that the
Housing and Community Development Act "significantly enlarged
HUD's role in the creation of housing opportunities" 8' through the Sec-
tion 8 Lower-Income Housing Assistance Program.2 82 In the Court's
278. Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538, 1548 (1976), citing 1967 site approval rules
in DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Low-RENT HOUSING MANUAL § 205.1,
4(g) (Feb. 1967 rev.).
279. The Court mentioned the project selection criteria in Evaluation of Rent Supple-
ment Projects and Low-Rent Housing Assistance Applications, 37 Fed. Reg. 203 (1972),
96 S. Ct. at 1548.
The eight project selection criteria were, at least in part, judicially impelled. Cf.
Shannon v. H.U.D., 436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970) and Hicks v. Weaver, 302 F. Supp.
619 (E.D. La. 1969). The fourth criterion reflects regionalism, its objectives including
the development of housing consistent with "officially approved State or multijurisdic-
tional plans." This criterion calls for the development of "areawide plans which include
a housing element relative to needs and goals for low- and moderate-income housing as
well as balanced production throughout a metropolitan area." 24 C.F.R. § 200.710
(1976).
Though not mentioned by Justice Stewart, the 1968 Fair Housing Act was also im-
plemented with affirmative fair housing market regulations requiring, in Secretary Rom-
ney's words, "that users of our housing programs take affirmative steps to make minority
citizens aware of the availability of that housing." Hearings on H.R. 13337 Before the
Subcomm. on Housing of the House Comm. on Banking & Currency, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., pt. 1, at 39 (1972) (statement of HUD Secretary George Romney). See also Im-
plementational Affirmative Fair Housing Marketing Regulations, H.U.D. HANDBOOK,
§ 8030.2 (June, 1973 rev.).
280. 96 S. Ct. at 1548, citing 42 U.S.C. §9 5301(c)(6), 5304(a)(4)(A), (C)(ii)
(Supp. IV, 1974); H.R. REP. No. 1114, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974). Among the im-
plementing HUD regulations are those which direct that sites be chosen to "promote
greater choice of housing opportunities and avoid undue concentration of assisted per-
sons in areas containing a high proportion of low-income persons." 24 C.F.R. 99
880.112(d), 883.209(a) (3) (1976).
281. 96 S. Ct. at 1549.
282. HUD is empowered by Section 8 of the Housing and Community Development
Act to make assistance contracts with private and public sponsors of newly constructed
and substantially rehabilitated housing. Existing housing, the major program currently
operational, may be owned by private lessors and contract authority for such shelter lies
with local housing authorities in most cases, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c) (Supp. IV, 1974).
Pursuant to the agreements, HUD pays the difference between the monthly rent required
of the family (ranging between 15% and 25% of its gross income), and the monthly
rent assigned by the contract to the housing unit. Income, number of children, medical
expenses, etc., control the amount paid by the family, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c)(3) (Supp.
IV, 1974). Families with incomes that do not exceed 80% of the median income of the
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view Congress has continued its pursuit of desegregated living patterns
that began with the passage of the 1968 Civil Rights Act and has at the
same time given HUD additional devices with which to achieve fair
housing goals.
These strategies reflect an increasing emphasis in federal housing
programs on regionalist planning.2"' The Housing and Community
Development Act makes federal funds available for a wide variety of
community development projects, including the acquisition of deteri-
orating property or property that is appropriate for conservation activi-
ties, the restoration of historic sites, and the conservation of natural re-
sources and scenic areas.28 4 Federal HCDA funds also may be used
for installation of public works and facilities, such as senior citizen cen-
ters, historic properties, and water and sewer facilities. The benefits
of federal funds for such a wide range of projects attracts many commu-
nities that would not otherwise consider providing low-income housing.
The Housing and Community Development Act, however, prohibits the
grant of HCDA funds unless the application includes a housing assist-
ance plan.2"5 In planning for the needs of lower income persons, a
community seeking federal HCDA funds not only must include the
needs of its existing citizens but also must calculate the needs of those
"expected to reside" in the community.28 6 The Housing and Commu-
nity Development Act thus requires communities, when assessing their
housing needs in pursuit of HCDA funds, to look beyond the needs
of their current residents to include the needs of those who can be ex-
pected to reside in the community. 28 7
The "expected to reside" formula may prove to be more than hor-
tatorical. In City of Hartford v. Hills a federal court enjoined seven
suburban towns in the Hartford, Connecticut area from spending ap-
proximately $4 million in community development grants approved by
area are eligible for the program, and 30% of all § 8 units each year must serve house-
holds with incomes not exceeding 50% of the area's median income, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f
(c)(4), (c)(7), and (f) (Supp. IV, 1974). A fair market rent established by HUD
for a project's housing area controls the amount of rent a landlord can charge for each
unit, but contracts provide for annual up-dating of fair market rents. Contract rents
should not exceed fair market rents by more than 10%, but 20% is sometimes permis-
sible, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). Contracts may be long-term, (up to 15
years for existing units) but only up to 20 years for new or substantially rehabilitated
units, a period that is not as long as that of the usual mortgage periods, a factor which
has diminished private sector interest in the program, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(e) (Supp. IV,
1974).
Despite the Court's opinion in Gautreaux, the statutes, and the regulations, the pro-
gram has been less than a success. See note 20 supra, and Note, Federal Leased Hous-
ing Assistance in Private Accommodations: Section 8, 8 MicH. J.L. REFORM 676 (1975).
283. See generally, the well-documented and invaluable analysis of the regional focus
in federal housing programs contained in Rubinowitz & Dennis, supra note 268.
284. 42 U.S.C. § 5305(a) (Supp. IV, 1974).
285. Id. at § 5304(a)(4).
286. Id. at § 5304(a) (4) (A) (Supp.V, 1975).
287. H.R. REP. No. 1114, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1974).
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HUD.2"" HUD had allocated the funds even though six of the towns
had submitted applications indicating that "zero" additional persons
were "expected to reside" and the seventh town had advanced a token
figure. The court concluded that the Housing and Community Devel-
opment Act does not permit HUD to waive any portion of the statutory
requirement for a complete Housing Assistance Plan. Because a
waiver is impermissible, the housing assistance plans, which are pre-
requisites for the grant of community development funds, were inade-
quate. The court found that the "expected to reside" information is
the "keystone to the spatial deconcentration objective" of the Housing
and Community Development Act. 289
In Gautreaux Justice Stewart sought to demonstrate that his opin-
ion was compatible with local control of the planning process,290 dis-
cussing ways in which HUD may consider local views before imple-
menting a housing assistance plan.29' In a footnote, however, the
288. City of Hartford v. Hills, 408 F. Supp. 889 (D. Conn. 1976). Other proposals
for HCDA expenditures have come under attack. The Western Center on Law and Pov-
erty, Inc. of Los Angeles settled a lawsuit in June, 1976 in which the legal services pro-
gram had sought to prevent the City of Alhambra, California from spending community
development block grant funds for a golf course expansion. The June settlement cli-
maxed lengthy negotiations and led to an arrangement by which the City's first year
plan remains unchanged in exchange for second and third year applications to HUD that
call for spending $1,161,000 (previously earmarked for a golf course expansion) on proj-
ects vital to the needs of low-income residents, including $400,000 on housing rehabilita-
tion, Newsletter, Western Center on Law and Poverty, Inc., July 7, 1976, at 4. See 10
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 53 (May, 1976). Another lawsuit challenging HUD approval
of HCDA funds for parkland purchase is described in N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1975, News
of New Jersey at NJ1, col. 2.
Since the Hartford challenge, HUD has altered its "expected to reside" regulations.
See 24 C.F.R. § 570.303(c)(2)(ii) (1976), which provides that the assessment of the
needs of households "expected to reside" shall include estimates of the number of lower-
income families with workers already employed in the community, currently living else-
where, who would reasonably be expected to reside in the community if housing were
available which they could afford. The applicant for HCDA funds must use federal
census data, or local data if it is more recent. The regulation sets forth a detailed five
step method that applicants must follow in deriving the number of low-income families
"expected to reside," id.
289. 408 F. Supp. at 901.
290. 96 S. Ct. at 1550.
291. The HCDA permits a municipality to prepare a "housing assistance plan," 42
U.S.C. § 5304(a)(4) (Supp. IV, 1974). The plan is necessary to applications for com-
munity development revenue sharing funds which may be used for a broad range of non-
housing development, redevelopment, and renewal activities as well as housing programs,
42 U.S.C. 9H 5304(a), 5305 (Supp. IV, 1974). Once the plan has been filed, it provides
the basis for assessing proposals for housing assistance. Units of local government may
comment on any application for housing funds on the ground that it is inconsistent with
the approved plan. However, the project may proceed if the HUD Secretary determines
that the application is consistent with the plan, 42 U.S.C. §9 1439(a)-(c) (Supp. IV,
1974). If there is no plan for the local unit of government, the HUD Secretary must
still give the local governmental entity 30 days to comment on the proposal. Thereafter
approval may be granted, 42 U.S.C. § 1439(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). In short, the local
community draws a housing assistance plan pursuant to HUD guidelines, but HUD ad-
ministers the new and substantially rehabilitated housing programs of the Act's section
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Court acknowledged that once a housing assistance plan was submitted
by a locality and approved by HUD, specific projects could be funded
if consistent with .the plan despite subsequent objections by the local
governmental entity to the character of the project.292 The Court also
noted that the housing assistance plan "must assess the needs of lower-
income persons residing in or expected to reside in the community
,1293
Although the tenor of the Gautreaux opinion suggests that no low-
income housing would be approved without substantial input by af-
fected communities, 94 the 1974 Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act eliminates local governmental approval as a prerequisite for
federally subsidized housing provided under the programs established
by the Act. 295  At least on its face, the Section 8 program, which has
largely replaced the older federal low-income housing programs,29
permits HUD approval of an application even where a community has
sought to block federally aided housing by not applying for HCDA
funds and thus not filing a housing assistance plan as part of the pro-
cess.297  Furthermore, if the number of proposed units is twelve or less,
8. The existing housing program is administered by local housing authorities under poli-
cies largely influenced by HUD.
292. 96 S. Ct. at 1549 n.21.
293. Id.
294. The Supreme Court did note that "the local comment and objection procedures
do not apply to applications for assistance involving 12 or fewer units in a single project
or development," Id. One commentator has argued that "[a] municipality can block any
subsidized housing proposal by claiming that it is inconsistent with its housing assistance
plan," and that "a municipality which is able to gain HUD acceptance of a meager hous-
ing assistance plan can exclude from its boundaries most proposed Section 8 projects."
Ackerman, The Mount Laurel Decision: Expanding the Boundaries of Zoning Reform,
1976 U. ILL. L.F. 1, 41. Professor Ackerman's typically astute comments are at the
very least politically realistic even if, in bare technical terms, they sweep somewhat
broadly.
295. Respondent's Brief at 53, Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
296. 96 S. Ct. at 1549. The major rent subsidy directly administered by HUD prior
to the passage of Section 8 was authorized by the National Housing Act § 236, 12 U.S.C.
§ 1715z-1 (1970). Section 236 did not require local approvals and provided for mort-
gage insurance and interest reduction payments on behalf of owners of rental housing
projects occupied by low-income families. The transition to Section 8 and a description
of Section 236 is contained in McGee, Book Review, Housing Subsidies in the U.S. and
England, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 734, 739-45 (1975).
Because sections 235 and 236 of the National Housing Act are the only subsidy
programs that require no local approval other than the usual zoning and building
code clearances, they are the housing programs most often ensnarled in zoning con-
troversies. In order to halt public housing or rent supplements, a city council need
only refrain from passing the necessary enabling resolutions, while exclusionary
zoning, on the other hand, may be their only defense against 235 and 236 housing.
Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CAL.
L. REv. 1384, 1447 n.210 (1971). See the discussion of the snarl caused by a Section
236 program, in the Village of Arlington Heights, Illinois, text accompanying notes 155-
70 supra.
297. 42 U.S.C. § 1439 (Supp. IV, 1974). The local unit, however, does have 30
days to comment on the proposal which as a practical matter gives it additional time
to mobilize political opposition to the project. The effect of the opposition will vary
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HUD may fund the project without even permitting the local commu-
nity an opportunity to comment or object.298 In assessing applications,
HUD may use its own data to estimate housing need, thereby avoiding
reliance on coerced or reluctantly drawn "expected to reside" calcula-
tions advanced by exclusionary communities. 99 After establishing hous-
ing need independently of a local community's projections, HUD's area
offices can solicit applications for housing funds from private owners and
developers.10 Both public housing authorities and private owners may
submit applications for -funding of new construction or substantially re-
habilitated units.3 0' Although HUD has presently designated subsidies
for rental units in existing housing (the major operational Section 8
program) for public housing authorities, Section 8 allows applications
to be submitted for such housing by private owners. 02 Most impor-
tantly, HUD has the power to determine site location in implementing
its goal of dispersal of low-income groups.10 3  In many cases the sites
must inevitably be located in all white, often suburban, areas.30 4
In summary, the essence of the Housing and Community Develop-
ment Act is its command that local housing needs be assessed and met
on an area-wide basis before federal funds are awarded for any com-
munity development. To implement this policy the Act has sufficient
mechanisms to permit housing development without local assent. Thus,
those communities that regard the provision of low-income shelter (and
significant racial integration) as too high a price to pay for federal
community development assistance may still be subject to some housing
with the need for the project and the political situation of the community involved. No
doubt, as the Court observed in Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1549 n.21, the size of the project
will be important, not only because if it is less than 13 units the local comment provi-
sions do not apply, but also because the smaller the project (in the eyes of many com-
munities) the less significant is the threat.
298. 42 U.S.C. § 1439(b) (Supp. IV, 1974). Even the small ceiling on projects
which do not require local comment may be seen as a significant breakthrough (or foot
in the door). As the entry for October, 1975 in the Appendix to this article suggests,
infra at 1014-15, a plan by the Chicago Housing Authority and HUD to scatter 84 units
over 15 different sites, with no site larger than 8 units, triggered a law suit that was ap-
pealed all the way to the Supreme Court. The court of appeals upheld the district
judge's finding that the evidence did not support the claim "that prospective tenants of
public housing are more likely to engage in anti-social conduct than present community
residents." Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147, 150
(N.D. Il1. 1973), af!'d, 524 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967
(1976). Perhaps the opposition was in part due to the fact that the projects were con-
ventional public housing, but contrast the last paragraph of note 42, supra.
299. 24 C.F.R. § 882.202 (1976).
300. 42 U.S.C. § 1439(c) (Supp. IV, 1974). 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.121(a), 882.203(b)
(1976).
301. 24 C.F.R. § 882.203(a) (1976). 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(4) (Supp. IV, 1974).
302. 24 C.F.R. §§ 882.121, 882.102 (1976).
303. 24 C.F.R. § 882.203(b) (1976).
304. Sites must be chosen to "promote greater choice of housing opportunities and
avoid undue concentration of assisted persons in areas containing a high proportion of
low-income persons," 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.112(d), 883.209(a)(3) (1976).
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for excluded groups if a political subdivision that encompasses the
community seeks HCDA funds.3 0 5
Finally, if the "expected to reside" calculation does not make the
regional planning emphasis clear, the Housing and Community Devel-
opment Act provides for review of the application by an area-wide
agency. 06 The area-wide agency reviews the application to evaluate
the consistency of the community's application for federal funds with
pre-existing regional plans and policies. This approach supports the
observation by commentators that the Housing and Community Devel-
opment Act "dramatically demonstrates Congress's increased concern
that local planning designed to meet housing needs be carried out on
a regional basis. 30 7  The entire community development application
may be rejected if the regional agency finds the housing assistance plan
inconsistent with regional plans and policies.308
By interpreting the Housing and Community Development Act to
complement and support prior fair housing and low-rent housing legis-
lation, the Court in Gautreaux may have buttressed the already power-
ful forces that seek to disperse racial minorities. This approach is nec-
essary as the nature of the race problem increasingly becomes a prob-
lem of socio-economic class.309  Even though some commentators view
305. HCDA grants may be made to states and to local units of governments, 42
U.S.C. § 5303(a)(1) (Supp. IV, 1974). Local communities that seek to avoid desegre-
gation thus may be specified as sites for low income housing by the state or any local
governmental unit, id. at § 5302(a)(1), which seeks HCDA funds and must, therefore,
submit a plan which "avoids undue concentration of assisted persons in areas containing
a high proportion of low-income persons," 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.112(d), 883.209(a)(3)
(1976).
306. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(e) (Supp. IV, 1974) requires that the housing assistance plan
be submitted to a regional "clearinghouse" for comment. The "A-95" review process
was developed by the Office of Management and Budget to ensure regional planning and
implementation of housing programs. BUREAU OF THE BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-95,
July 24, 1969, revised in OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR No. A-95 RE-
visED, Feb. 9, 1971, and described in OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, CIRCULAR
No. A-95: WAT IT Is, How IT WORKS (1973). The local governmental unit that seeks
federal funds notifies the regional clearinghouse that reviews the application and solicits
comments from other governmental units such as civil rights agencies or other munici-
palities.
In turn the regional clearinghouse forwards the application with its comments to
HUD, which, according to Secretary Hills, "looks hard at [the] comments in judging
the local plans against the realities of regional development." HUD News Release,
May 28, 1975 Remarks Prepared for Delivery by Secretary Carla A. Hills to the Annual
Meeting of the National Association of Regional Councils at 4, in Boston, Mass. In the
same address, Secretary Hills encouraged the regional agencies to:
Draw an areawide housing plan for your metropolitan area which is factually un-
assailable in assessing the housing needs of workers in relation to the locations of
their employment. Then, use your metropolitan plan as the A-95 standard against
which to measure local [housing assistance plans]. Id. at 7.
307. Rubinowitz & Dennis, supra note 268, at 161.
308. 42 U.S.C. § 5304(c) (Supp. IV, 1974).
309. Bayard Rustin, President of the A. Philip Randolph Institute of New York City
and long-time civil rights activist, has stated that:
After the Watts riot and the other riots of the 1960's,. .. the Kemer Commis-
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regionalism as a two-edged sword that may be used to speed desegre-
gation or that affluent areas may employ to impede economic and racial
integration,31 ° and while dispersal may not be an unmixed blessing for
blacks,31' the Court seems, all things considered, to have endorsed a
planning theory that will enjoy popularity for some time to come."1 2
The Court's apparent approval of regionalism and racial dispersion may
provide the necessary impetus for overcoming the barriers which cur-
sion warned that the United States was in danger of becoming two nations-one
black and one white. This is a wrong definition of the threat. The danger is that
we are moving toward a nation divided between those who have it and those who
cannot make it. That cuts across black-white lines.
In other words, the future advancement of blacks and other poor in this coun-
try has very little to do with the color of their skin.
Ten years ago there was indeed wide-spread discrimination against blacks in
work. Now there is still some, but discrimination is not the main enemy where
work is concerned. The problem now has to do with the nature of production. We
are no longer a society prepared to buy the muscle power of the poor. For every
black who cannot get a job because of his race, there are ten blacks who cannot
get a job because this society is not buying muscle power as it did when the immi-
grants were arriving from Europe.
Donovan, The Black Problem Is Now a Class Problem, L.A. Times, Aug. 11, 1976, Pt.
II, at 5, col. 1.
310. See, e.g., Burchell, et al., supra note 267, at 268, where it is argued that:
The popular depiction of suburbia as an exclusive cordon sanitaire surrounding
the inner city is absurdly far from the mark. Today most suburban workers reside
in suburban areas and there is increasing evidence that viewed from the appropriate
regional scope, substantial quantities of housing are available for all classes of sub-
urban workers. The case study presented here demonstrates this fact for one hous-
ing market within the New York metropolitan area. If the results presented here
can be generalized to other areas, it is clear that the regional approach to the analy-
sis may backfire, and work to justify the status quo.
The authors concede, by the way, that "minority workers face much different problems
in penetrating the suburbs than do low-income workers in general, and the discussion
of the particular problems of racial segregation should be examined separately from the
general question of exclusion on the basis of income." Id. at 266 n. 15.
311. Alexander Polikoff, principal attorney in Gautreaux, has written that the
spectre of overwhelmingly black inner cities
is not uniformly viewed as the end of the world. As thoughtful an observer
as Nathan Glazer has opined that, although the apartheid prospect at one time ap-
peared 'disastrous', experience suggests that growing black economic capacity may
enable our metropolitan areas to avoid self-destructive confrontations. Others, for
example Anthony Henry of the National Tenants Organization, espouse black cities,
or at least black cores of cities, as a means to black political and economic power,
and ultimately, perhaps, to the only valid basis for a coming together of black and
white society-interaction between groups that have become true equals. A sizable
literature now argues that view.
Polikoff, Housing and Race: An Urban Dilemma, THE BPI MAGAZINE, 1976, at 9-10
(A publication of the Business and Professional People for the Public Interest, Chicago,
Illinois). Some of the problems of dispersal mentioned by Mr. Polikoff are discussed
in McGee, Power(lessness) and Dispersion: Comments on Chester McGuire's "The
Urban Development Act of 1974, Community Development Funds and Black Economic
Problems", V BLACK L.J. - (1976), reprinted in EMERGING ISSUES IN BLACK ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT (Bobo and Osborne eds., 1976). A fresh look at the problems of school
desegregation that questions dispersal for dispersal's sake so far as it affects the quality
of education for black school children is contained in Bell, Serving Two Masters: Inte-
gration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470
(1976).
312. Listokin, Fairshare Housing Distribution: An Idea Whose Time Has Come?,
NEW JERSEY TRFNms, cited in Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 174, 336 A.2d 713, 733 (1975).
rently preclude full implementation of these conceptions of planning
and social policy.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Gautreaux may be less important
than the long struggle in which it was a milestone. The decade of legal
trench warfare in which lawyers struggled to desegregate Chicago pub-
lic housing may instead constitute a far more meaningful chapter in
American legal history. By perseverance, diligence, and intelligence,
Dorothy Gautreaux's attorneys "raise[d] issues of value to [their] cli-
ents irrespective of the preferences of government officials, ' 1 8 and de-
feated efforts by the political establishment in both Chicago and Wash-
ington to pander to segregationist sectors of American society. The
importance of the Court's decision is that it lends prestige to the
legal, moral, and policy arguments advanced on behalf of blacks with
respect to housing which is a necessity of life. 14 Gautreaux, there-
fore, is an additional manifestation that the Court continues to serve
as the ultimate refuge of minorities, vindicating James Madison's view
that
If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent
tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bul-
wark against every assumption of power in the Legislative or
Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment
upon rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the dec-
laration of rights. 15
Placing pyrrhic victories to the side, though, the Court has only
"grasped the nettle" in a case in which racial discrimination was con-
ceded by all the litigants. The Court's continuation as a major force in
contemporary social controversy, however, is questionable if its decisions
313. E. JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM; THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE O.E.O.
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 279-80 (1974).
314. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921) (Holmes, J.). Since Holmes' dictum,
Mr. Justice White, while refusing to "denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and
sanitary housing," declared for the Court that "the Constitution does not provide judicial
remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document
any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality.... .Lind-
sey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
315. 1 Annals of Congress, 439, quoted by Mr. Justice Black in H. BLACK, A CON-
STInUTrONAL FArH 19 (1968), where he added his belief that "such judicial power is
an essential feature of our type of free government, and ...it ill behooves the courts
to restrict their usefulness in protecting constitutional rights by creating artificial judicial
obstacles tothe full performance of their duty." Indeed Gautreaux supports Professor
Louis Henkin's assertion that "[s]ince Frankfurter and Black wrote [during the New
Deal era], judicial review has had a new birth, its character and content reformed, and
its place established as a hallmark of American political life, even a birthright of every
inhabitant." Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine? 85 YALE L.J. 597, 625
(1976).
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in cases like Washington v. Davis16 and Eastlake"'7 are indications of
its unwillingness to enter the battleground of racial and socio-economic
conflict. The Court's judgment on the planning strategems of the Vil-
lage of Arlington Heights318 may pursue the morality, if not the logic
and reasoning of Gautreaux, and disapprove of efforts, much too late
in the nation's history, to perpetuate the division of Americans along
racial lines.
316. See text accompanying notes 85-126 supra.
317. See text accompanying notes 217-22 supra.
318. See text accompanying notes 155-70 supra.
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APPENDIX
THE SAGA OF DOROTHY GAUTREAUX
A history of the litigation leading to the Supreme Court decision in
Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S.Ct. 1538 (1976), would consume an article by it-
self. The skeletal chronology below is one example of the tortuous process
public housing tenants may have to follow to vindicate their Constitutional
rights.
1966: Dorothy Gautreaux and other tenants in and applicants
for public housing sue charging the Chicago Housing
Authority with violating their rights under the fourteenth
amendment by intentionally selecting sites and assigning
apartments to maintain existing patterns of racial sep-
aration. Another count charged that 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981
and 1983 were violated regardless of intent by failing to
select sites to alleviate residential segregation. Simulta-
neously suit was filed against the Secretary of the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development charging that
HUD had violated the fifth amendment due process clause
in assisting CHA in its racial segregation efforts. The
suit against HUD was stayed pending resolution of the
action against the housing authority. The two cases were
consolidated after the court of appeals, in September of
1971, held that HUD was complicitous in the scheme to
segregate Chicago's public housing, Gautreaux v. Romney,
448 F.2d 731 (7th Cir. 1971).
1967: CHA's motion for summary judgment denied. Gautreaux
v. Chicago Housing Authority, 265 F. Supp. 582 (N.D.
111. 1967).
1969: Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment granted, district
court Judge Austin holding that CHA had discriminated
in its site selection and tenant assignment practices. Gau-
treaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 296 F. Supp. 907
(N.D. Ill. 1969).
July, 1969:
July, 1970:
Judgment order entered enjoining CHA's construction of
public housing units in census tracts more than 30%
black unless it constructed at least 75% of the total units
planned outside those areas. A voluntary provision per-
mitted up to one-third of any housing constructed under
the order to be within suburban Cook County if arrange-
ments were made with the Housing Authority of Cook
County. Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 304
F. Supp. 736 (N.D. 111. 1969).
District court judge entered unpublished order modifying
July, 1969 order that had included a "best efforts" pro-
vision obligating CHA to increase the supply of housing
units. The new order imposed a timetable for submission
March,
February,
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September, 1970:
December, 1970:
September, 1971:
October, 1971:
March, 1972:
April, 1972:
of public housing units for approval by the city council.
Prior to July, 1970, supplemental orders had been entered
on September 12, 1969, September 15, 1969, October 20,
1969, October 23, 1969, and November 24, 1969. In
May, 1970 plaintiffs' lawyer sought to determine why new
sites had not been submitted to the Chicago city council
in accordance with Illinois law, but was advised that none
would be submitted until after the mayoral election in
April of the next year. Five conferences were then held
with the district court judge culminating in the July 20,
1970 order. See summary of December, 1970, court
action infra.
HUD's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and fail-
ure to state a claim granted by the district court judge in
unpublished memorandum opinion. See summary of Sep-
tember, 1971, court action infra.
The court of appeals affirmed the order of July, 1970 im-
posing a timetable on the CHA for submission of sites for
1500 units to the Chicago city council, finding that the
arguments against submission were "based on political
considerations and community hostility." Gautreaux v.
Chicago Housing Authority, 436 F.2d 306, 313 (7th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 922 (1971).
Finding that HUD spent $350 million "in a manner which
perpetuated a racially discriminatory housing system in
Chicago" in violation of the fifth amendment, the court
of appeals reversed the district court dismissal of the com-
plaint against HUD and ordered summary judgment for
the plaintiffs under the Constitution and § 601 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. Gautreaux v. Romney, 448
F.2d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 1971).
In the district judge's words, "with a gun to [the CHA's]
head," 20 months after the first decree and 8 months after
the second, "sites for seventeen hundred odd units were
finally disgorged and submitted to the City Council for its
approval." But although the mayor and various city offi-
cials signed a letter of intent to process the submitted sites
to induce HUD to grant 26 million dollars in Model Cities
Program funds, the district judge enjoined distribution of
the money "until. . . minimum compliance" with the let-
ter of intent and decrees was achieved. Gautreaux v.
Romney, 332 F. Supp. 366, 368, 370 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
The court of appeals reversed the order enjoining HUD
distribution of Model Cities Program money because of a
lack of relationship between public housing program dis-
crimination and model cities activity. Gautreaux v. Rom-
ney, 457 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1972).
Because the city council persisted in its refusal to approve
the CHA submitted sites, the district judge joined the
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City of Chicago and city council members as defendants
and suspended the state law that required their approval
before construction could commence. The court ordered
the sites submitted directly to HUD. Gautreaux v. Chi-
cago Housing Authority, 342 F. Supp. 827 (1972). See
summary of October, 1975, court actions, infra.
May, 1973: The court of appeals affirmed the district court order
suspending state law requiring submission of sites to the
city council because the "City by its earlier discriminatory
action and later by its inaction has made itself a party to
the discrimination 'as a joint participant.'" Gautreaux
v. City of Chicago, 480 F.2d 210, 214 (7th Cir. 1973),
citing Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715 (1961) and Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S.
145 (1965).
September, 1973: The district judge refused to grant metropolitan area relief,
because "the wrongs were committed within the limits of
Chicago and solely against residents of the City." Yet a
metropolitan area remedy would involve political entities
which previously had nothing to do with the lawsuit. Gau-
treaux v. Romney, 363 F. Supp. 690, 691 (N.D. Ill.
1973).
August, 1974: The court of appeals reversed the district judge and re-
manded for consideration of a "comprehensive metropoli-
tan area plan that will not only disestablish the segregated
public housing system in the City of Chicago ... but will
increase the supply of dwelling units as rapidly as possi-
ble." Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing Authority, 503 F.
2d 930-39 (7th Cir. 1974).
November, 1974: A United States magistrate was appointed to serve as a
master because "for the past five years and four months,
no public housing construction has been completed by
either party," the master was charged "to study and re-
view the existing patterns of racial segregation in Chicago
public housing, to determine and identify the precise caus-
es of the . . . delay." Gautreaux v. Chicago Housing
Authority, 384 F. Supp. 37, 39 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
January, 1975: The court of appeals denied a writ of mandamus to vacate
the appointment of the master, finding no abdication
of judicial decision-making responsibility by the district
court judge. Chicago Housing Authority v. Austin, 511
F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1975).
October, 1975: Pursuant to the April, 1972 order bypassing the city
council, the CHA and HUD instituted an 84-unit scat-
tered-site project (15 different sites with no more than 8
units per site) in predominantly white areas. A suit which
had been filed in 1972 by an incorporated coalition of resi-
dents sought an injunction on the ground that HUD had
1014 [Vol. 1976
DESEGREGATED HOUSING
April, 1976:
June 7, 1976:
failed to file an environmental impact statement pursuant
to § 102 of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332, (1970), assessing the impact of
siting low-income public housing in middle and working
class neighborhoods. In November, 1973, senior district
court Judge Julius J. Hoffman (of "Chicago Seven" fame)
had held that the evidence did not support the claim "that
prospective tenants of public housing are more likely to
engage in anti-social conduct than present community
residents." Nucleus of Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v.
Lynn, 372 F. Supp. 147, 150 (N.D. IMI. 1973). The
court of appeals affirmed the judgment for HUD holding,
inter alia, that the agency had considered "the impact of
the scattered-site housing on the social fabric of the recip-
ient communities," and that "there is little reason to be-
lieve the influx of new CHA tenants will drastically alter
the character of, a neighborhood." Nucleus of Chicago
Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 231 (7th Cir.
1975), cert denied, 96 S. Ct. 1462 (1976).
Hills v. Gautreaux, 96 S. Ct. 1538 (1976).
Attorneys for HUD and the tenants agreed to postpone,
at least until April 1, 1977, their request for a metropoli-
tan area order and to undertake a metropolitan area dem-
onstration program for approximately 400 plaintiff-class
families under HUD's Section 8 Existing Housing pro-
gram. The families were to be dispersed throughout the
six-county Chicago standard metropolitan statistical area.
Up to 100 of the units would be in Chicago or minority
areas outside the city. Copy of letter of understanding on
file with the University of Illinois Law Forum. See also
Gautreaux Case Prompts Chicago Demonstration, 33 J.
HOuSING 282 (1976).
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